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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This is a study designed to compare the attitudes
of top management in the Navy f s officer corps with the
attitudes of the Navy's uniformed public information
officers. The attitudes compared are those relating to the
news media of mass communications. A principal purpose of
the study is to find out whether or not there is an
internal "communications gap" within the Navy between these
two groups* and to assess the implications of the findings
for Navy public relations.
Although this is problem-oriented applied research*
it has larger dimensions. Professional public relations is
a twentieth century phenomenon that caste into being when
owners and managers of large business enterprises found it
necessary to defend themselves from a variety of attacks in
the public arena. Most of the attacks involved accusations
that they were not serving the public interest. The
villains of the plot* from the management point of view*
were most often representatives of the news media. Early
public relations people were usually men who had media
experience. They could be counted on to use their friendly
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2relations with the press to enhance the reputation of the
client. A three-way relationship developed* with manage-
ment pursuing its goals* newsmen probing in accordance with
their values* and public relations personnel trying to
mediate and* in some cases* to manipulate. Progressive
development of public relations philosophy has convinced
many practitioners that the useful n»«« of an organization
and its p**r formanca should be the bases for public
attitudes toward the organization* and that the public
relations function is socially justified when it ethically
and effectively pleads the cause of a client or organiza-
tion in the forum of public debate. Public awareness of
the usefulness and the performance of an organization comes
through communication* 9in& public relations practitioners
can facilitate that communication. Some practitioners also
feel that by stressing the need for public approval* they
may actually improve the conduct of the organizations they
serve.
As organizations have grown in size* the three-way
relationship between management* public relations staff*
and the news media has become institutionalized. Public
relations staffs have become fixtures in most large
organizations of American society* including government
organizations. Mass society* mass democracy* mass
organizations and mass media produced the mass mediator.
















3relations specialist * whether in government* business* or
some other area* is still the "man in the middle" in press
relations. "To be effective in his role as a go-between*
"
they say* "the practitioner must have the full confidence
of his organization and of the press. This is not easy.
Their interests often conflict. " (p. 303) This conflict
of interests may become an internal organizational problem*
with management viewing the public relations staff as an
advocate for the "other side* H and public relations people
seeing management as unreasonably rigid in its policies.
A key factor in this situation is the nature of the
perceptions held by management of the attitudes of the
public relations staff* and vice versa. If the public
relations people are viewed as being overly favorable to
the news media, for example* they are not likely to have
the full confidence of management. If management is seen
as being extremely hostile to the news media* public
relations staff members may repress policy recommendations
that appear to favor the media.
This three-way relationship becomes particularly
evident in military services* where hierarchical structures
of authority make the attitudes of seniors extremely
important and at the same time inhibit the flow of internal
communications on which attitudes are based* justified or
altered. It is not necessarily true that communication in









4fact* the reverse is more likely. A great deal of face-to-
face eofflmu^io^ion in military settings consists of juniors
briefing seniors on their programs and advocating their
goals. What is important is that dagiaiona are "from the
top down" and what staff members thi^ak the boss will decide
often takes the place of a verbalized decision. Programs
and goals may be tailored to the perceptions staff officers
have of what management will approve.
Perceived attitudes* then* are a critical factor in
the functioning of any large organisation. In military
public relations matters* especially* perceptions may be
inaccurate due to a tendency toward a minimum of discussion
and a maximum of presumption.
For this study* we take a particular bureaucracy
and try to find out whether or not there is an internal
"communications gap" between top management and public
relations staff. As a special case* the Navy can be
contrasted with other bureaucracies* including other
military organizations. Here we have an extremely large
organization with a hierarchical rank structure and a great
deal of organizational tradition and folklore. Within the
organization we can isolate two groups and call them top
management and public relations staff. The Navy's flag
officers—in peacetime* its Admirals* Vice Admirals and
I1W








Rear Admirals —can be considered representative of top
management. This group is certainly not the totality of
top management in the organization* since "command" is a
Navy concept that applies equally to the Lieutenant
Commander or Lieutenant who is skipper of a minesweeper*
the Captain who is in charge of an aircraft carrier, and
the Vice Admiral who has a fleet at his direction. The
flag officer group* however, can be considered those at the
pinnacle of management. The Navy^s public affairs special-
2ists represent its public relations staff. These officers
are designated as specialists by the Navy. They move from
one public information assignment to another* working as
technical experts whether in the Pentagon* at sea on the
staff of a fleet commander* or in a naval district head-
quarters in the Midwest. They have no commands, and their
specialty has had no flag officers since it was created by
the Navy at the close of World War II. They are not the
"Flag officer" refers to any office above the
grade of captain. The Navy has a one star wartime rank*
commodore* below rear admiral and above captain* that
corresponds to brigadier general in the Army. Fleet
admiral* a permanent five star rank* was last authorized in
World war II.
The military term currently used for officers who
work in this area is "public affairs officer." The title
"public relations officer" is not used by the military.
Throughout this study the terms public affairs specialist*












6totality cf Navy public relations* since there are non-
specialists in public affairs assignments and since the
Navy has traditionally adhered to the enigmatic philosophy
that public relations is a "responsibility of command* and
at the same time an "ail hands job. " Yet the specialists
are unquestionably the technocrats of public relations
within the Navy's bureaucracy.
This degree of specialisation for public affairs
officers* the relative ease in identifying a top management
group* and the Navy's reputation as the "silent service" in
its relations with the news media make it a particularly
appropriate subject for this study. Like other military
services* the Navy is a prototype of the large bureaucratic
organization. A study of its top management and public
relations staff and their attitudes toward the news media
should offer some findings that may be generalizable to
other organizational settings.
With this in mind* there are questions to be asked
about the attitudes of the two groups typified by these
Navy officers. These should be raised
i
What attitudes do top managers in this large organ-
isation hold toward the news media?
Are these attitudes similar to those held by the
organization's public relations staff members?
Does each of these groups have an accurate percep-










dro erf* vef feltrf mmr.*jjta*£ 9dS
7What are the implications for the organization, of
these attitudes and perceptions?
Are there general implications for mass communica-
tion research* for other organizations* for the news
media* or for the study and practice of public
relations?
One factor enhanced this study but could have
affected it negatively* The researcher is a Navy public
affairs specialist* and he has worked with flag officers
for the past twelve years. This provided a professional
interest in the research project* It also enabled the
researcher to obtain cooperation for the study* something
social scientists often find difficult* It required*
however* that the study be carefully designed to control
for personal biases that might otherwise intrude*
The design for the study was strongly influenced by
the coorientational approach outlined by Chaffee and McLeod
(1968; Chaffee* McLeod and Guerrero* 1969). They suggest
that since almost any definition of communication involves
at least two persons* it seems reasonable to make an effort
to observe and theorize about interpersonal coorientation*
rather than to study intr^personal orientation and assume
that communication was "somehow" involved* Their approach
includes an explicit model* The coorientational model
assumes that a person cooriented with another person has at
least two distinguishable sets of cognitions* Each knows









8what be thinks, and ho has some estimate of what other
person (s) think. By using a set of empirical measures* we
can apply this model to find out what Admirals think about
the news media, what information officers think about the
news ir.edia, and what each of chese iffrggltss "thinks the
other group thinks." That is precisely what this study has
attempted to do, by using a set of statements that are
either generally favorable or generally unfavorable to the
news media, and asking individuals whether they tend to
agree or disagree with the statements—and then asking them
how they think the other group would respond to the same
statements. The study produced data about the information
sources of the respondents and other descriptive material,
but the focus of the work has narrowed to these questions!
What are the attitudes held by flag officers toward
a set of statements that are generally favorable or
unfavorable to the news media?
What are the attitudes held by information
specialists toward the same set of statements?
How much agreement is there between these two
groups?
How accurate is each group at estimating the
attitudes of the other?
How much congruency is perceived? (i.e.. To what
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9This empirical framework allows us to use precise
measures to compare group attitudes toward the media.
Based on this comparison* we can venture a partial analysis
of the relationship between top management and public
relations staff in the Navy and assess the specific and




This chapter discusses the major variables of the
study and introduces the hypotheses that are to be tested.
It reviews literature about the study of large organiza-
tions and shows how the roles of flag officer and
information officer are formalised in the Navy. "Attitude
toward the news media" is defined. Historical relation-
ships between the military and the news media are examined.
The coorientational approach is described and the variables
of the coorlentation model are defined. Research findings
and other reasons leading to the general hypotheses are
reviewed.
Organisational Studies
Institutions of business* government* education*
labor* communications* etc.* have developed hierarchical
administrative and operative social machinery. Systematic
investigation of the patterns of interaction and inter-
personal relations by Blau and his associates (1956* 1963*
1967) developed organizational theory as a conceptual
framework for the study of society. Blau (1956) notes that














The formal organization, with its explicit regulations and
official positions, constitutes "controlled" conditions.
These controls have not been artificially introduced by the
scientist but are an inherent part of the bureaucratic
structure. Blau admits that the daily activities and
interactions of the members of a bureaucracy cannot be
entirely accounted for by the official blueprint. One
prime example of "bureaucracy's other face" cited by Blau
is the Navy, where informal relations, not officially
recognized, play a part in producing efficient solutions
that are not possible within the framework of the official
institutional structure. As a result, he concedes that
bureaucracies are not such rigid structures as is popularly
assumed, and that informal interactions are examples of
bureaucracy in the process of change. "Nevertheless, the
explicitly formal organization, the characteristics of
which can be easily ascertained, reduces the number of
variable conditions in the bureaucratic situation and
thereby facilitates the search for and the testing of
explanatory hypotheses. * (p. 25)
Flag, Qfficar gafl Information,
Officer RQiae in Um fiflvy
A key to understanding a bureaucracy is knowledge
about the social roles within it. Flag officers and
information officers in the Navy can be thought of as

















Allen and Sorbin (in Lindzey* 1968) describe role as a
metaphoric term borrowed directly from the theater
*
intended to denote that conduct adheres to certain •parts"
(or positions) rather than to the players who read or
recite thems
The conceptual bridge between social structure and
role behavior is the concept of role expectation?! -
This is a cognitive concept * the content of which
consists of beliefs* expectancies* subjective probabil-
ities, and so on* The units of social structure are
positions or statuses (in specialised contexts* jobs
and offices) • These units are defined in terms of
actions and qualities expected of the person who at any
time occupies the position. For example* the person
who occupies the position of college president is
expected to engage in certain actions and not in
others* (p. 497)
Navy flag officers* too* are expected to engage in
certain activities and not in others* They constitute the
recognised leadership of the Navy* and they are assigned to
specific jobs calling for skill* experience and motivation
they are expected to possess* They even have certain
expectations in relations with the news media and the
public that are different from other naval officers*
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer* Chief of Naval Operations* told a
group of newly appointed flag officers in 1969
i
By assuming the rank of Rear Admiral* two very
interesting changes will most probably affect you
insofar as your relations with the public are
concerned* First* you will gain a great deal more
visibility* and secondly* you'll find your role as an
authority on naval matters will increase* As a Rear
Admiral* you will stand out more in the crowd*
Enlisted men* and some junior officers* will give you
more maneuvering room* But you'll also discover that
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situations* you'll make friends more easily than you
thought possible* and doors previously reluctant to
open will swing wide and welcome for you. Your
presence on the rostrum will be more in demand* and
important civilians will want to include you in their
social and community activities. All of this is
important and desirable* because you are a member of
the Navy's executive management team. I'm sure you
will adjust to this increased visibility and I hope
you will enjoy it. There are other ramifications to
this visibility* however. ... Suppose a major acci-
dent occurs and it involves personnel and equipment in
your command. ... A rumor is spreading in the commun-
ity adjacent to your shore command which alleges the
accident could well have posed a threat to the safety
of your civilian neighbors. Once again* you could not
be more visible if you tried* as far as the community's
leaders are concerned. As the man-in-charge* it's up
to you to present the facts* clarify the false
information* and quickly dispatch the rumor. Ostrich-
like behavior in such cases* is unacceptable. You're
the flag officer* the ball is yours* and you are
expected to run with it. (Text of remarks at the
Senior Executive Management Course* U. S. Naval War
College* Newport* R. I.* August 8* 1969.)
If the flag officer is expected to run with the
ball in such cases* it is the public affairs officer's role
to block for him. Information officers are specialists
within the Navy's officer corps. Their expertise is in
dealing with the Navy's publics* including the news media.
Although they are expected to have motivations similar to
other naval officers* they are expected to possess skills
in the public relations area. Their role also calls for
them to be staff men* not policy-makers. Lang (in Janowitz*
1964) provides this analysis]
The distinction between line officer and specialist
is most explicit in the Navy. The Navy's promotion
system is geared to the advancement of unrestricted
line officers* the only ones qualified to command at
















consisting of engineering duty officers* aeronautical
engineering duty officers and special duty officers in
such fields as communications* intelligence ... and
public information are clearly recognized. Staff corps
officers* a third category* are commissioned in or
assigned to the Chaplain's Corps* the Civil Engineer's
Corps* the Supply Corps* and the various medical
service corps* The advancement of officers not in the
unrestricted line is linked to the advancement of those
qualified for seagoing command by a "running mate"
principle* which preserves the integrity of the rank
structure but prescribes distinct career lines, (p. 75)
Role theorists devote much attention to conflicts
in which the individual finds himself the occupant of two
positions with conflicting role expectations. Burchard
(1954) used empirical data to show that the position of a
military chaplain leads to a role conflict. Be serves in
both military and religious hierarchies, according to
Burchard* the chaplain seeks to reconcile this conflict
either through "rationalisation" or through "compartraental-
ization" of role behaviors; rationalization of conflict in
roles tends to strengthen the chaplain's role of military
officer at the expense of his role of minister of the
gospel. Burchard* s study dealt with the extreme case of
individuals serving in two value-oriented hierarchical
organizations* religious and military. Mo such conflict
exists for flag officers or information officers. There
may be role conflicts for officers who see themselves as
having expectations other than those prescribed for their
official positions in the Bavy* but it seems reasonable in








role expect at ions* formalized by the organization.
Attitude toward fcha Maw Mudlq
Organizational roles may have a strong relationship
to attitudes held by individuals in the military toward the
news media. Before discussing the relationship between
military organizations and the news media, however, we
should define the variable "attitude toward the news
media."
Attitude studies are plentiful in the social
sciences, and definitions of attitude are also commonplace.
Insko (1967. p. 2) provides a useful summary of much of the
theoretical work in this area. These are examples of
definitions he lists
i
"An attitude is a mental and neural state of
readiness, organized through experience, exerting a
directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's
response to all objects and situations with which it is
related." (Allport. 1935)
"Attitude is primarily a way of being 'set' toward
or against certain things." (Murphy. Murphy and Hewcomb.
1937)
An attitude is a "relatively stable affective
response to an object." (Rosenberg. 1956)
An attitude is a "tendency or disposition to evalu-











way." (Katz and Stotland* 1959)
Insko concluded that for most contemporary
theorists the concept of attitude specifically implies
affect or feeling of pro or con, favorability or unfavor-
ability with regard to a particular object or entity. It
seems that the disputes over the exact locus or nature of
this affective bond have receded* in comparison with a
strong concurrence among researchers that "something"
affective is certainly "there"—and is roughly measurable.
This "affect or feeling" is usually observed
empirically by the use of verbal behavior measures* such as
self-reported questionnaire items. This approach is often
taken in behavioral science research to produce data
representing mental attitudes, and to demonstrate the
direction and intensity of attitudes.
In the framework that will guide this research*
"news media" refers specifically to the channels of mass
communications that are generally recognized as the primary
carriers of timely formal news content and comment* namely*
television* radio* newspapers* and periodicals. Motion
pictures and books are excluded from this definition.
*s defined for this study* then* attitude toward
the news media is an individual's mental affective position*
as reflected by his verbal self-description, with regard to
formal channels of news communication* people associated
















Attitude toward the news media is, therefore* an
evaluation. The attitude may be related to actual behavior,
but it should be recognized that behavioral effects beyond
the measured verbal behavior may not necessarily result




The military-media relationship is most often
studied or discussed from the point of view of the news
media. When military attitudes toward the media are com-
mented on, military services and military officers are
often pictured as holding hostile attitudes toward the
media. One general theme is that military organizations*
through elaborate information machinery, generate public
attitudes favorable to self-serving military policies,
while opposing any open discussion of substantial military
questions. Mills (1956) viewed military leaders as part of
a "power elite 1* utilizing extensive communications and
public relations techniques to achieve unworthy goals.
Wiggins (1964), a media spokesman, saw an intense conflict
between freedom of the press and military security policy.
Rosten (1937) failed to discover a single
Washington correspondent who concentrated on the military
departments in peacetime. Slightly more than two decades
later. Underwood (1960) found that there was a Pentagon













press corps of specialized reporters which had* with little
notice* become an influential group. He interviewed roost
of the approximately three dozen military writers in
Washington and found that many complained about "ingrained
cautiousness" on the part of military officials which
hindered reporting* as did "failure of officials to trust
responsible newsmen. " Rivers (1965* p. 24) quotes one
Defense Department correspondent as saying* "By and large*
the regulars see themselves as a squad of guerrilla fighters
in a journalistic army of desk jockeys. They consider
their beat to be tougher and more complex than any other*
and they rate the department news policies under which they
function much more restrictive than those anywhere else in
Washington.
"
Some observers have commented that the basis for
much information policy in the military services seems to
be one of informing the public about those things
considered "gooc" in terms of generating support for
military programs* and avoiding disclosures of "bad" news.
In particular, the Navy's reputation as the "silent
service" implies that it routinely avoids disclosure of all
sorts. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs Phil G. Goulding, an ex-newsman* commented that the
Navy "is simply a little withdrawn from the rest of the
world and even a little peculiar." (1970* p. 141)
Actually* there are few empirical studies dealing
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with government or military attitudes toward the media, and
none dealing specifically with aavy flag officer and
information officer attitudes.
Janowitz (1960) produced sociological data about
professional military officers, and came to an intuitive
conclusion that there had been a change in the attitudes
held by military officials toward the news media. At one
time, he said, military leaders had a long-standing tradi-
tion of hostility to the press because of their dislike of
contradiction. "They saw journalists as particularly
obnoxious sources of public criticisms. (p. 395) But
World Wars I and II forced the military men to accept the
"public relations principle 1* to maintain "morale" on the
home front.
Huntington (1960) believed that the spur of compe-
tition in strategic programs drove the services to great
efforts to build up congressional and public support, a
conclusion based on his interpretation of events.
Winston, on the other hand, systematically surveyed
100 of the 140 Army generals on duty in Washington, D. C,
in 1962 to determine their attitudes toward the press and
Army information policies. He found that most of his
respondents thought the press was not properly serving the
people. They did not trust reporters. In a discussion of
his findings, Winston argued that the Army hierarchy needed








•aid that the generals were naive about the democratic
process t but not antagonistic toward it. Their loyalty to
the government* he felt* made it difficult for them to
understand the strange ways of the press which "seems to
criticize government most savagely in times of crisis.
"
Cohen (1963) used extensive interviews with persons
in foreign policy decision-making positions to describe
their attitudes toward and relationship with the press. He
quotes a former State Department official i "Prom the
standpoint of the State Department* the White House* the
Pentagon* the press is looked on as a dangerous* unattrac-
tive beast* which can lead you along for a little bit of
the way* but which is likely to turn and bite you at the
slightest opportunity. N (p. 168) Cohen's interviews showed
patterns of attitudes toward the press among foreign policy
makers as being both favorable and unfavorable* character-
ised by a "love-hate" relationship. On a frequency basis*
almost a third more respondents (78) in the Executive and
Legislative branches expressed negative attitudes toward
the press than made favorable remarks (60) • Unfavorable
attitudes were often based on a "pervading sense of fear"
growing out of the officials' inability to control what the
press does with the information it gets. Respondents
favorable to the press frequently expressed this in terms
of defense of the characteristics and qualities of
correspondents themselves* and their helpfulness in the
-MB*
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process of foreign policy-making. Cohen discusses institu-
tional and personality differences in attitude formation.
Some persons "naturally" find it easy to deal with the
press $ while others find it so difficult that they consis-
tently manage to avoid all contact with reporters. The
latter quit 3 apparently outnumber the former. Cohen argues
against the assumption that top-level officials can talk to
reporters with confidence that comes from their positions
of authority* while lower-level personnel are more reluc-
tant to put their careers at risk in these encounters. It
is easy, he says* to find good relationships and bad
relationships at all levels, and the State Department's
procedures which restrict the number of authoritative
spokesmen tends to make high-level officials cautious*
while releasing junior officials who will not be quoted for
attribution from their inhibitions with the press. Cohen
touches on the key theme of this research
a
It is sometimes argued* for example* that the
P-area people—the Public Affairs advisors, the men in
the Mews Office and the other offices and divisions of
the Bureau of Public Affairs—who are professionally
concerned with the State Department's public relations*
are more likely to be favorably disposed toward the
press* while the desk officers—the substantive people*
the Poreign Service professionals—have a fundamental
antipathy toward the press and other "outside"
institutions. There is quite a bit of secondary
evidence that supports the main burden of this distinc-
tion? most Poreign Service officers are not in direct
contact with the press* whether or not their instinct
is to avoid it* as one of them asserted. And in the
P-area* officials talk freely of their "constant
battle" with the desk officers on behalf of "maximum
... 4
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disclosure, "We wish to make full information avail-
able and appear a little bolder; Foreign Service
Officers are cautious. . . . " Hera, too* we lack the
data properly to evaluate this hypothesis, but we can
at least indicate some qualifications that should be
considered. • • • In the first place, the distinction
itself is not wholly valid, since many persons in the
P-area are Foreign Service Officers on normal assign-
ment. ... Furthermore ... there is circumstantial
evidence that more than just a few desk officers axa in
contact with the press. ... The line of distinction
that seems most valid here, as elsewhere, is • • •
between those people in all classifications and at
evary level in the Department who are confident in
their dealings with the press, and those who are not.
(p. 156f)
This distinction is important, but there is reason
to believe that it is more applicable to the State
Department than to the Defense Department, especially its
Navy component. Navy public affairs officers do not rotate
to and from other areas. There is reason to believe that
they do indeed have more frequent contacts with the media
than line officers, and that these contacts are probably
more pleasant than those of other officers.
Dunn (1969) examined relationships between newsmen
and public officials in Wisconsin state government. 8s
concludes that public officials' views of the press are
conditioned most by the extent to which they perceive the
press as helping them achieve their goals. "When the press
serves his purposes* an official sees it as helpful,
believes that it is performing its work well, and is
willing to cooperate with it. But when the press acts
contrary to his purposes, he sees it as a hindrance.
:>C= Mfttfd
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believes that it is performing its work badly, and is
likely to get into conflict with it." (p. 35) Dunn found
in interviews with 45 public officials that the total
number of favorable evaluatory comments about reporters,
papers, editorial writers or the press in general numbered
178, while unfavorable comments numbered 274. Fully 56 per
cent of the executive officials, administrators, and
legislative leaders he interviewed made more unfavorable
than favorable evaluations, 40 per cent made more favorable
than unfavorable evaluations, and 4 per cent gave an equal
number of favorable and unfavorable evaluations
•
In a carefully designed study of the attitudes and
perceptions of government (non-military) information
officials and newsmen in Washington, Nimmo (1964) found
that government information officers have three distinct,
although usually overlapping, functions: (1) service to
the public, the media, and to the administrator; (2) pro-
motion of the organization as a propagandist, publicist or
public relations man; and (3) policy-making, either through
personal decision or by exercising popular controls over
policy-makers. The first of these functions, that of a
facilitator providing service, seemed to predominate in the
cases Nimmo studied. "The picture that emerges, therefore,
is of the information officer as a servant to the public,
organization, and press. M (p. 31) Be used a framework that




officers with attitudes of information officers toward
newsmen* and pointed out other relationships for possible
comparison in the same way: the relationship between news-
managers (i.e.* editors and producers) and reporters* and
the relationship between government decision-makers and
information officers. This study borrows Nimmo's suggestion
for research and applies it to the Navy in a systematic
manner by using the coorientational approach.
Tha CQwrjentatiPn
The coorientation model* as suggested and expanded
by Chaffee and McLeod (1967* 1968* 1969)* involves in its
basic form two persons in orientation toward the same
object. The question of its utility for groups of individ-
uals is unresolved* due to problems associated with
reification; but it has been used as a framework for
question-raising and measurement in studies of professional
communicators by Went* (1968) and by Martin at sj.. (1970).
In the context of relationships in a hierarchical organiza-
tion like the Navy* there is a certain utility* it seems*
to knowing the nature of the stereotyped or "reified other"
perception held by individuals* since this reification
refers to deeply institutionalised roles.
The coorientation model involves three variables.
The first is agr^mant . the extent to which two persons—or
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their orientation toward some object or entity in their
psychological environment. The second variable is
accuracy, the correctness with which they perceive the
others' evaluation of the object or entity. The third is
congruangy. the extent to which one group thinks the other
agrees. Figure 1 shows the coorientational model , as
conceptualized for this study.
From the viewpoint of communication theory, this
model is significant in that it suggests that effective
communication should, at least, increase accuracy.
Increased communication may also increase agreement and
congruency, but this is not a prediction to be made lightly,
since values are personally derived from experience.
Communication may bring little or no change to deeply held
values.
Chaffee, McLeod and Guerrero (1969) report one
experiment, for example, in which coorientational variables
were measured before and after discussion. P.t the beginning
of interview sessions, husband-wife pairs were asked about
their opinions on a series of current issues, and about
what they thought their spouse's opinions would be. Later,
after a 15-minute period in which they discussed these
current issues, they were asked the same questions. Chaffee
and McLeod report that correlations were found between
congruency in the first question period and agreement and
accuracy in the second, and between agreement in the first
































Notes Boxes in this diagram indicate measures that
are taken on each group. Arrows connecting boxes indicate
the measures that are compared in constructing the
component indices.
Pig. 1.—Component Evaluative Indices of the Coorientation















and accuracy in the second. These results suggest that
accuracy improves with communication, as might be expected.
They also suggest that two people who think they agree are
more likely to explain their values to one another in a
communication situation. In this case, the open communica-
tion seemed to foster agreement, too. But perhaps it would
not be inappropriate to assume that most of the husband-
wife pairs liked each other, or that there was some attrac-
tion that might have led to a "strain toward symmetry " of
the type Hewcomb (1953) discussed. In a larger study*
O'Keefe (1970) attempted to determine the effect of com-
munication on the coorientation variables in parent-
adolescent pairs. His data* gathered from 1,266 Wisconsin
junior and senior high school students and their parents,
showed that higher communication was significantly
associated with higher coorientation scores concerning the
importance of the child's going to college. But the data
did not clearly show this relationship for a group of
political issue items* Thus* while communication may or
may not be important in harmonizing attitudes, it is
interesting to speculate about the part it plays under
specific conditions. Such speculation is particularly
interesting when we are talking about groups that are
vitally important to the public relations of a specific
large military organization (the Navy) and when the atti-
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of mass communications. In this context and in a single
study* we touch on many of the basic concerns in present-
day study of communications and journalisms interpersonal
communications* attitudes* the mass media* government-media
relations* and organisational public relations.
One study cannot hope to contribute significantly
in all these areas; it seems apparent that the first order
of business should be to hypothesize about the relationship
of attitudes held by flag officers and by information
officers* and to test these hypotheses empirically* using
coorientational measures.
fienaral flypothfiaeg
Using this conceptual framework* the researcher
designed a study to measure basic feelings toward the news
media held by a representative group of Navy flag officers
and a representative group of Navy public affairs officers.
Research was directed toward determining the following
t
(a) the characteristics of these groups* and the sources
of information they utilize;
(b) their attitudes toward the news media;
(c) whether or not they tend to reify the other group*
and if so*
(d) the perceptions held by each of the groups of the
attitudes of the other group;
(e) the amount of agreement between the attitudes of the







(f) the degree of accuracy with which they perceive
each others' views* and
(g) the degree of congruency (perceived agreement) of
each toward the other.
Hypotheses to be tested and an elaboration of the
research and reasoning that leads to each are as follows
t
(l) The attitudes, of Navy flag offieara toward thn rawira
adia ara significantly leas favorable than the attitudes
M tfavy information officers*
A basic finding in social psychology is that people
"hold opinions* attitudes and beliefs in harmony with their
group memberships and identifications." (Berelson and
Steiner* 1964* p. 566) Winston's evidence indicated that
Army general officers were hostile to the news media* and
intuitive assessments by Janowitz and Huntington lead to
similar conclusions* Few Admirals have media experience
which would lead them to sympathize with the technical
problems associated with news reporting* whereas informa-
tion officers* often from media backgrounds* work with
newsmen regularly. Information officers are likely to have
routine satisfactory contacts with media representatives*
particularly in light of Nimmo's finding that government
information officers view their role as one of facilitating
the work of the news media. On the other hand* flag
officer contacts with the media* as Admiral Moorer's
II
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remarks to the Rear Admiral selectees indicate* are often
crisis-oriented. Cherished service-connected values held
by Admirals may be threatened by news media coverage*
especially if the coverage includes embarrassing revela-
tions* inaccuracies* or biased reporting. These factors
lead to the hypothesis that the information officers'
attitudes will be more favorable to the news media than the
flag officers* will be.
This does not mean that either group can be
declared favorable or unfavorable to the media* although
some inferences may be drawn. In testing this hypothesis*
we cannot measure favorability or unfavorability in an
absolute sense* because we cannot measure attitudes on
scales that begin at a "sero point** and progress in
standardised equal intervals from zero up or down. We can
make some general comments about the way Admirals* and
PADa* attitudes seem to compare with current attitudes in
American society as a whole. And while it is equally
impossible to say whether the American public is "for" or
"against" the media* there are some indications that
general public opinion is not overwhelmingly favorable to
the media. A CBS News poll of a random national telephone
sample of 1*136 adults asked this questions "Except in time
of war* do you think newspapers* radio and television
should have the right to report any story* even if the
government feels it's harmful to our national interests?"












The responses Yes, 42 per cent; No, 55 per cent; Sometimes,
one per cent; Ho Response* two per cent. (New York Times .
April 16, 1970, p. 37) The Gallup Organization was commis-
sioned by tewaw^ftk magazine to determine attitudes toward
the media of a representative sample of 1,560 Americans.
The magazine reported (November 9, 1970, p. 22f) that the
key finding of this study was that most Americans believe
the media do a good job of reporting the news but that many
are "vexed by what they consider cases of prejudice, dis-
tortion and unfair selectivity. " People who tended to be
most critical of bias or inaccuracy were those who were
best educated and best informed.
We can look at the group attitude indicators and
compare them against these very general indicators of
American public opinion about the media, but we cannot
flatly say that either group is favorable or unfavorable in
an absolute sense. What we can do is test Hypothesis 1,
and in so doing we should be able to say that one group-
either Admirals or PAOs—is more favorable to the media
than the other.
(2) information officera.have a reified, concept of flag
officerg, and, axe able to. indicate what they think the
attitudes of "aoat flag officers" ara« flag officera are
able, to make the aaiaft aort Qf generalisation concerning















McLeod and Chaffee (in Tedeschi, 1971) observes
"If we are interested in treating the reification of groups
as a measured variable rather than as an assumed property,
it is important to state the conditions necessary to
reification from the point of view of the person, and to
develop appropriate operational definitions for the d^rae
&£ JCfU fixation in the person *a judgment of a group or
collectivity. n For purposes of this research, we are quite
concerned about reification as an either-or phenomenon,
something that is generally either real, or not real, for
each of the groups studied* We also would like to know, at
least in a loose way, the degree to which each group tends
to perceive the other group as a "generalized other." Most
information officers have worked for or observed one or
more flag officers. The attitudes of flag officers are
important to them in the bureaucratic decision-making
process. Admirals, for the most part, have had contact
with information officers, but there is little likelihood
that they have given much thought to what information
officers think about the news media. Martin a£ aJL* found
that newspaper editors in Wisconsin had a generalised
impression of their "readers, and Wents found that ex-Navy
men were willing to generalize about the attitudes of the
"public," and showed a considerable amount of success in
assessing aggregate opinion. It is hypothesized, therefore,














other as groups whose attitudes can be reified, but that
flag officers will find this reification a more uncomfort-
able mental evolution*
(3) Attitudes of flag offleam toward th<* n»w« madia
are perceived by information officara aa being mor^
unfavorable than they actually mmi attitudes of informa-
tion officers are jtawslaej toy Mto&ttli aa JMlSj more
favorable toward the media than they actually are*
Went 2 found that his respondents were inaccurate
*
in an interesting way. They ranked the prestige of "U. S.
Navy officer" and "U. S. Navy enlisted man" according to
the order in which they thought "a cross-section of the
American public" would rank them. Ex-Navy respondents
ranked both Navy officers and Navy enlisted men as higher
in prestige than a national poll had found them to be* but
they thought the poll ranking would be lower than it
actually was. If Hypothesis 1 is confirmed* a similar
displacement or "contrast effect" (Sherif and Hovland*
1961) in the direction of perceiving less congruency than
there actually is would tend to make flag officers see
information officers as more favorable to the press than
they actually are* and would tend to make information
officers see Admirals as more unfavorable to the media than
they actually are. Berelson and Steiner report findings
indicating that communications down the organisational
hierarchy are likely to be critical* and communications up
iflaai£ miff Kiimttm ¥till tmdt nttfatwrtM
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the hierarchy are likely to be commendatory. Thus some
members of organizations are nervously looking upward while
their superiors assess them* and bad news is held up or
distorted in order to keep the good opinions of those
higher up. Critical opinions held by flag officers about
the news media, the area of the information officers* work,
are more likely to be communicated than commendatory ones,
and information officer perceptions of Admirals' attitudes
are likely to be distorted. A tendency by information
officers to "tell the boss what he wants to hear" might
lead to a similar distortion of attitude perception by the
flag officers, but "the more rigidly or formally organised
the hierarchy, the less upward flow of informal communica-
tions. " (p. 370) The question here is whether the
"contrast effect" described by Sherif and Hovland is
affected by distorted or nonexistent upward communication.
At any rate, the presumption of this hypothesis is that
there is a "communications gap" within the Navy organisation
that distorts group perceptions.
U> Information officers are more accurate In estimating
flag officer opinions than vice-versa*
As with Hypothesis 2, this hypothesis is based on
the presumption that the attitudes of flag officers are
more salient and important to information officers than
information officers* attitudes are to those at the higher



















therefore make a greater effort to determine flag officer
attitudes. Because they try harder, they are more
accurate. This sort of reasoning explains Martinis rather
surprising finding that Wisconsin newspaper editors had a
more accurate perception of their readers' attitudes about
riots at the University of Wisconsin than the readers had
about the editors' attitudes, despite the fact that the
editors were communicating to the readers, presumably. The
opinions of the public, we suspect, may have been more
salient and important to the editors than vice-versa,
despite journalistic folklore to the contrary. Of possible
relevance, too, is Wentz' finding that value-oriented mass
communicators were more accurate in assessing the public's
views than others. The explanation follows this line of
reasoning t advertising and public relations men know what
values the public holds because that is their main task,
whereas those in electronic media are not so accurate in
assessing public opinion because they deal in outputs of
communications but get few inputs from the public. If we
follow similar reasoning, it seems that public affairs
officers, constantly involved in scanning the environment
to determine the attitudes of various groups and the
general public, would tend to be accurate in predicting
attitudes. Flag officers get few inputs from the informa-








(5) Conaraencv (perceived a^raemant) is yreatar fcr
Admirals than for information officers.
People may think their evaluations are the same as
other people's* without that necessarily being the case*
This could be called "perceived cognitive overlap, " but for
simplicity Chaffee and McLeod refer to it as "congruency.
"
If the rationale used for Hypothesis 3 is followed, we see
that flag officers can be thought of as being unfavorable
toward the news media and as perceiving information
officers to be favorable* relatively speaking. Information
officers, on the other hand, could be considered as being
favorable to the media, while perceiving relative unfavor-
ability on the part of the Admirals. The question here is
the degree of difference in these perceived attitudes. If
we suppose that there is some sort of distortion of the
Admirals* perception of information officer attitudes due
to an organisational constraint that calls for the lower
ranking officials to "tell the boss what he wants to hear,"
it is logical to assume that the flag officers perceive
more Agreement than the information officers perceive.
(6) Both information officers and flag officers are
leaa favorable toward talaviaion than toward newspapers, OX
n^ya magazine
—
particularly with regard to whether MM
about the Mavy ia reported in a fair and unbiased way.
This hypothesis is intuitive and tentative. It
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great influence on the American public, and a resultant
sensitivity to the television news content that is more
pronounced than their sensitivity to newspaper and,
certainly, news magazines. It also presumes that the
attitudes of these officials may have been affected by
public attacks on the objectivity of neW3 coverage in the
broadcasting industry initiated by high government spokes-
men, especially Vice President Spiro Agnew, in late 1969.
These attacks continued through the time of this survey.
(Chapter III contains a review of the news environment
during this period of time*) A basic tenet involved is the
finding that attitudes within a group are particularly
subject to influence "by the most respected and prestigious
member(s) of the group, the opinion leader (s)." (Berelson
and Steiner, 1964, p. 569) Also worth considering is the
impact of a CBS television documentary about the management
of a torpedo development project by the Navy. "Cost over-
runs" were highlighted in the program. In addition, it is
clear that findings of attitudes critical of television are
not unusual in empirical research. Walters (1970) inter-
viewed 76 women at Madison, Wisconsin, and found that 58 per
cent indicated strong agreement that television interfered
with family activities, and that 49 per cent felt strongly
that television was a barrier to family communication.
More to the point, Steiner (1963) reported that in a









like to get your opinions about how Radio* Newspapers*
Television and Magazines compare. Generally speaking*
which of these would you say presents the fairest* most
unbiased news?" Responses* by percentage were as follows)
newspapers* 31 per cent; television* 28 per cent; radio* 20
per cent; magazines* 11 per cent; and 10 per cent* don't
know. These events and findings resulted in Hypothesis 6*
which is contrary to an alternate hypothesis that is also
backed up by empirical data. The alternate prediction
would be that most media audience members think newspapers
and news magazines are more biased than the broadcast
media* since the broadcasters are bound by government
regulations and a "fairness" doctrine. One finds support
for this hypothesis in data gathered by the Gallup opinion
research firm in December 1969* after Vice President Agnew
leveled his accusations against the broadcasters. Gallup 's
poll contained this questions "There has been much talk
about whether the TV networks deal fairly with all sides in
presenting the news dealing with political and social
issues. How do you feel about this ... do they deal
fairly with all sides or do they tend to favor one side?"
Forty per cant of the respondents said TV deals fairly* 42
per cent said it favors one side* 18 per cent had no
opinion. Ken in the sample said "deal fairly" 39 per cent
of the time; "favor one side*" 46 per cent; and 15 per cent
had no opinion. While this did not represent a ringing
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endorsement for television, it nevertheless bettered the
score newspapers had on the same question. Only 37 per
cent of the total sample said newspapers deal fairly, 45
per cent thought they favor one side. Agwin, the men in
the sample were more positives 37 per cent said "deal
fairly" and 49 per cent said "favor one side.** For the
reasons cited above, we hypothesize that the results of
this nations 1 poll will be reversed for the fla$ and
information officers insofar as Navy news is concerned,
although there is no reason to think that this hypothesis
will be strongly supported.
(7) Both information officers and flag officarg ba1i«ve
that othgr military services arfi more favored by the madia
than,. the.Mayy is.
Zt seems natural enough to feel that someone else
may be getting a "better deal" than you are. This is
certainly likely to be the feeling when naval officers look
at media coverage of their service. For one thing, these
officers probably tend to select news about their service
to watch, read or hear. Since military news is so often
crisis or controversy oriented, the result is that these
officers are cognizant of a disproportionate amount of
"unfavorable" news about their service. It is not
hypothesized here, however, that Navy officers necessarily
feel that the Army is more favored by the news media than









Army had its share of unfortunate and reportable experi-
ences in the Vietnam War* riven before* Navy opinion was
that the Army had less public respect than any other
service. A sample survey of 583 recently separated Navy
and Marine Corps officers and enlisted men conducted by the
Harris organization in 1965 for the Navy Department showed
that only one per cent of the respondents felt the Army was
the most respected service * compared to 46 per cent who
felt the Navy was the most respected. Past reputation and
publicity were the two most commonly given reasons for
these opinions. Why* then, might the Navy's flag and
information officers feel that the Air Force and the Marine
Corps are favored? Well* if the Army is not* and the Navy
is not* the only two left are the Air Force and the
Marines. There is little doubt that the Air Force* a young
and highly visible service* has been glamorized by the
media at times* or that the Marine Corps has regularly been
pictured in a heroic mode. At any rate* it is hypothesized
that the naval officers will perceive things as being this
way insofar as news media coverage is concerned.
,pf Hypqthfta.ea
The hypotheses to be tested in this research* then*
are as followst
H-l. The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the
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attitudes of Navy information officers.
H-2. Information officers have a reified concept of
flag officers , and are able to indicate what they think the
attitudes of "most flag officers" are. Flag officers are
able to make the same sort of generalization concerning
"most information officers* " but not to the same extent
that information officers can*
H-3. Attitudes of flag officers toward the news media
are perceived by information officers as being more
unfavorable than they actually are? attitudes of informa-
tion officers are perceived by Admirals as being more
favorable toward the media than they actually are.
H-4. Information officers are more accurate in
estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa.
H-5. Congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for
Admirals than for information officers.
H-6. Both information officers and flag officers are
less favorable toward television than toward newspapers* or
news magazines
—
particularly with regard to whether news
about the Navy is reported in a fair and unbiased way.
H-7. Both flag officers and information officers
believe that other military services are more favored by














The basic instrument of measurement for this study
was a self-administered anonymous questionnaire which Navy
flag officers and information officers in the Washington,
D. C, area were asked to complete in early 1970.
Ranflflrch Location
The location of the study was Washington for two
principal reasons
s
(1) Limiting the study to one area provides a uniform
mass media menu. In Washington, there is a major morning
newspaper. The Washington EqsJl, a major evening newspaper,
T"e Evening SJtar., and a tabloid afternoon paper, Scripps
Howard's Washington Daily NfiWjEL. Other Bast Coast newspapers
are easily available, in particular the jgflw. York Tjjnga,
Kail Street Journal and Baltimore Sjih. in addition, most
of the respondents are provided a clipping service reprint
of articles of interest to the Department of Defense, as
well as summaries of television news reports and comment*
The three major television network evening news programs
are aired in consecutive half-hour time slots, so that
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news programs. ABC's evening news begins at 6s 30 p.m.*
NBC's starts at 7 p.m. * and the CBS evening news starts at
7 i 30. A metro-media television station and other local
channels provide non-network news programs. Radio stations
offer a variety of formats* and include network outlets.
Subscriptions by government offices make most periodicals
available.
(2) There are more flag officers and public affairs
officers stationed in Washington than at any other
location. The 156 Admirals listed in "United States Navy
Flag Officers on Active Duty in the Washington, D. C* Area"
(Bureau of Naval Personnel* March 1« 1970) represent 46 per
cent of all active duty flag officers in the Navy. Of 187
individuals listed on "Public Affairs Officer Roster"
(Chief of Information* Navy Department* January 1970)* 53
(28 per cent) were in Washington assignments. The remaining
flag officers and PAOs are spread all over the world* many
of them afloat. Thus* Washington is the only locale in
which enough respondents could be contacted to provide
statistically reliable estimates for data analysis.
The guxvay Graapa
(1) Flag officers. Admirals who were in the process of
arriving or departing Washington in assignment changes or
who were on extended temporary duty assignments away from
Washington were excluded from the survey* as were retired
flag officers filling active duty billets* and the Chief of
i *%it>a
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Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Also
excluded were officers at Annapolis* Hyattsville* and
Patuxent River* Md. Officers of the rank of Captain who
had been selected for promotion to Rear Admiral, but not
yet promoted* were included. The total survey population
was 141. Of these* 125 responded* for a response rate of
89 per cent.
(2) Public affairs officers. The PAO survey population
was 55. Of this number* 51 (93 per cent) responded. These
officers were all designated by the Navy in the Special
Duty (Public Affairs) category* except for one officer who
had served as an enlisted journalist in the Navy and was
assigned to the Media Relations Division of the Office of
Information on the press desk. Other officers serving in
public affairs assignments but not designated as specialists
were excluded from the survey.
Questionnaire Construction
The survey questionnaire was developed in a
communication research design seminar at the University of
Wisconsin. It was constructed in two very similar versions*
one for Admirals and one for PAOs. The two versions were
the same except for minor changes to make each appropriate
for its respondents and to obtain relevant demographic
data. Appendix A reproduces the basic questionnaire and
indicates the differences between the two versions. The











questionnaire was constructed to measure each respondent's
attitude toward the media and his perception of the
attitudes of the other group* and to ascertain his
information sources.
Variables and Thair flteflaurament
(1) Group Variables. The study proceeds from the
assumption that within a role group* attitudes will tend to
be somewhat homogeneous* Therefore* the role group to
which the respondent belongs becomes a key variable.
Characteristics used as variables for sub-group analysis
for the flag officers are educational level* source of
commission* area of military experience* service college
attendance* length of time a flag officer* and previous
duty in a public affairs assignment* Variables used for
sub-group analysis for the PAOs were educational level*
source of commission* length of time in the information
specialty* and rank*
(2) Information Sources* the "Multi-Media User," and
the "High Media User** Respondents were asked to indicate
their utilisation of television* radio* and daily newspapers
on the basis of whether they watched* heard* or read certain
news programs* news reports* and newspapers "never*
"
"rarely** "often*" or "daily*" Responses were coded on a
to 3 scale in ascending order (0 « "never") • In the case
of periodicals* respondents were asked to indicate whether
» ar v -*tfp








or not they "regularly read" certain publications. Group
means and standard deviations were computed for comparative
analysis. Also, respondents were divided into categories
according to the extent and variety of their media use.
Those who watched at least one television news program
often or daily, who heard at least one radio station's news
reports often or daily, who read at least one newspaper on
a daily basis* and who read at least one news magazine
regularly were considered "multi-media users" for
analysis purposes. Pa a variation of this, respondents
were allotted one point for each television news program
watched often or daily, one point for each radio station
whose news reports he heard often or daily, one point for
each newspaper read daily, and one point for each news
magazine read regularly. Respondents with a total of seven
or more points were considered "high media users*
"
(3) Reification. The ability or tendency of Admirals
and PAOs to reify the opposite group was measured by
analysis of "no opinion" responses to a question that asked
individuals to tell whether they thought "most flag
officers" (or "most public affairs officers") would tend
generally to agree or disagree with certain statements
about the news media. Responses of "no opinion" were
interpreted as indicating that the respondent could not* or
would not, estimate the attitudes of the others in a


















responses was taken as an indication of a low degree of
reification.
(4) Attitude Toward the Media. Respondents were asked
to read 11 statements about the news media and to indicate
whether they tend gon^rai iy to agree* disagree* or have no
opinion concerning each statement* Three of the statements
were specifically designed to determine whether the
respondent thought Navy news was fair and unbiased on the
television news program or programs he regularly watched*
and in the newspapers and news magazines he regularly read.
The other eight questions were designed to scale the
respondent's general attitude. They obtained measures on
his opinions on a variety of statements related to the news
media. A scale of favorability and unfavorability to the
news media was constructed and scores for the eight general
statements were summated and analyzed. A favorable
response to a statement was scored as one point* a no
opinion or neutral response was scored as two points* and
an unfavorable response was scored as three points. The
eight statements included five with which agreement was
scored as a favorable measure* and three with which agree'
ment was considered unfavorable. The summated point total
from these eight measures was used to rate individuals on a
scale ranging from eight points (highly favorable to the
media) to 24 points (highly unfavorable to the media) • To













respondent would have to agree with three statements
("Performance of the media is so bad that people should
insist it improve. " "There is too much interpretation of
the news on television. " "Newspaper editorials are overly
critical of government. ") * while disagreeing with five
statements ("News about the Navy is reported in a generally
fair and unbiased way. " "We need aggressive news reporting
to insure honesty in government." "Television is doing a
good job of reporting the news." "Most reporters are
trustworthy. "Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting
the news."). To score the optimum favorable number of
points* eight* the respondent would have to disagree with
the first three statements while agreeing with the last
five. Frequency counts and percentages were computed for
each of the statements and compared by role group.
(5) Coorientation Between Admirals and PAOs. For
analysis purposes* the Admirals and PAOs were divided into
"favorable" and "unfavorable" cells of relatively equal
size. Sub-analyses of these cells used demographic
variables* as well as the "multi-media user" and "high
media user" variables.
The coorientation model variables (Chaffee and
McLeod, 1968) were derived as follows x
Comparison of group mean attitude scores provided
a measure of the agr«»*>m«n» coorientation variable.
The eight statements were repeated later in the
questionnaire* with Admirals being asked what they thought
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most PAOS 1 attitudes would be* and vice versa. Prom this a
scale was constructed to provide a measure of perceived
agreement, the eongruency orientation variable.
Comparison of the mean actual score and the mean
perceived score for each group provided a measure of the
accuracy coorientation variable.
Pretest
h pretest was used to arrive at the method for
measurement of the attitudes just described * and to
estimate the utility of the questionnaire as a tool for
this research* The questionnaire designed for the pretest
was similar in format to the final version* but included
13 general statements about the news media instead of eight.
The pretest had the following objectives: to
determine whether or not individuals actually thought of
the media as being a single object or entity* to assess
their willingness to evaluate the media in the prescribed
format* to eliminate statements in the questionnaire that
might prove ambiguous or difficult to answer* to decide
whether or not individuals perceived flag officers and PAOs
as "generalized others" as a meaningful reification* and to
insure that the questionnaire could be completed rapidly
enough to insure an adequate response rate.
In the pretest* the questionnaire was administered
to 13 Navy* Marine Corps* Army and civilian information
specialists who were not in the group to be surveyed. It
* i
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was administered to two senior Navy officers and three
civilians who were asked to critique the questionnaire from
the point of view of flag officers. It was also reviewed
by two professors on the University of Wisconsin journalism
faculty.
The pretest showed that there was reason to believe
that all those pretested had a mental image of an entity,
"the news media, that was appropriate for the conceptual-
ization of the study. It indicated that several would have
preferred a less restrictive answer format. They felt that
a dichotomized agree/disagree response, with "no opinion"
as the only alternative* did not allow enough range for a
response which was, for example, 40 per cent agree and 60
per cent disagree. The pretest indicated, however, that
the respondents had little trouble in utilizing this format
for perceived attitudes, nor was there a problem insofar as
perception of generalized "others" was concerned. Inasmuch
as the respondents in the pretest did commit themselves to
an agree or disagree or no opinion attitude, despite
reluctance, and since use of a graded five point or seven
point scale would have required a more time-consuming and
perhaps more confusing questionnaire, while adding nothing
to an aggregated assessment of favorability and unfavor-
ability toward the media, the agree/disagree/no opinion
format was retained. To some extent, also, the "no opinion 1
category provided an index to the degree of reification
















perceived by individuals. Those who did not perceive the
group as a homogeneous entity would tend to opt for "no
opinion" rather than select an agree or disagree option.
Five of the 13 statements were eliminated by the pretest as
being ambiguous or misleading. For example* the statement
"American news media are a valuable intelligence source for
Russia" was deleted when it became apparent that this was
not a measure of attitude toward the media* but of knowl-
edge or opinion about the techniques of military
intelligence.
JtfBinifif.rfltiQn of. ths Quaationnairpi
Questionnaires were distributed by mail or
delivered to all prospective respondents during late March
and early April 1970. Appendix B reproduces the covering
letter used with the questionnaire. The covering letter
identified the researcher as a naval officer* and this was
done purposely for two reasons* to enhance the response
rate and to encourage the respondents to answer with
candor. Done of the respondents was told that the study
would compare flag officer and information officer atti-
tudes.
The Hava finvironrnfint at the
Time of the Study
This survey was conducted at a time when most
observers felt that the military's public image had











to blame the madia for delivering bad news has often been
discussed, and it should not be discounted in interpreting
the results of this survey* Events in Vietnam, the capture
of JU&& P»^HTn and a subsequent Court of Inquiry involving
the ship's crew, losses of nuclear submarines, collisions
at sea, and other incidents created enough bad news for the
Navy in the months and years prior to this survey to make
naval officers of all ranks and specialties acutely aware
of the role of the news media. If they were not aware of
this role and its relationship to government, remarks by
Vice President Agnew in late 1969 highly critical of the
news media may have called it to their attention. In
December 1969, jiav^ Xiffifca reported that Admiral 'Thomas H.
Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, said the attitude
taken by television and the press toward the man in uniform
was a dangerous thing. He said this attitude was influenc-
ing young men either not to get into the armed service or,
having gotten in, not to stay in. The result, he said,
could be real trouble for the Navy in the 1980s and 1990s.
Admiral Moorer's remarks, according to the service journal,
"mirrored the feeling long prevalent in the military that
only the bad, the violent and the disruptive make news."
(December 10, 1969, p. 4)
In addition, there were these related news reports
between February and April 1970s
(1) Dr. Walter Menninger, a member of the National











Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* sug-
gested in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington
that news reporters be licensed as doctors and lawyers aref
Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said he
would oppose strongly any attempt to do so.
(2) Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa charged that the
Nixon Administration was embarked on a course of restrict-
ing individual liberties. It started* Hughes said, with
intimidation of the news media by Vice President Spiro
Agnew and Attorney General John N. Mitchell*
(3) Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles accused the news
media of bombarding the public with nothing but bad news.
(4) The President of the United Mine Workers of
America* Anthony Boyle* said that his union had been the
victim of a "journalistic lynching bee" since the murder of
union official Joseph A. Yablonski.
(5) Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson* a Lyndon Johnson appointee* said that managers of
the nation 9 s media were not putting up much of a fight
against what he called Nixon Administration news censorship.
(6) Welfare Secretary Robert Finch killed in its
infancy a policy calling for written reports on all con-
tacts between newsmen and officials of the National
Institute of Mental Health.
(?) Vice President Agnew assailed what he called the
"liberal news media" for disseminating "drivel."
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(8) Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger
rebuffed a CBS network news team that attempted to cover
his speech to the American Bar Association after he had
said he would allow no television or radio coverage
•
(9) Senator Edmund 3. Muskie of Maine was named chair-
man of a committee of Democratic Party senators to try to
repair what they considered an "imbalance" of newspaper and
television coverage in favor of the Uixon Administration.
(10) Chairman Dean Burch of the Federal Communication
Commission said that Vice President Aynew probably
reflected the view of many Americans when he suggested that
"kooks" and "oddballs" be ignored by television and radio*
(11) CBS television's "60 Minutes" program on the
development of the Mark 48 torpedo included one witness who
called the Pentagon's handling of the matter "not a
disaster « but an atrocity* Cost overruns were the subject
of the report. The Navy originally refused to provide a
spokesman to discuss the project on the program* but the
civilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and
Development did participate*
(12) The first prize essay in the ms&L Institute
Progeadingg annual contest by Captain Robert J* Hanks*
0. S. Navy* blasted military critics for what he termed
their unfair attacks on the motives* abilities and integrity
of the officer corps. In "Against All Enemies*" he said it












(13) Vice President Agnew charged the news media
smeared government officials with "tons and tons of
innuendos" published in pursuit of Pulitzer Prises* while
glossing over the "evils of communism. " "Our madia* " he
said* "would be well advised to recognise a new dimension
of their responsibilities to critically examine our enemies
which have no free press to criticise them,"
(14) George Reedy* who had served as press secretary to
President Lyndon &• Johnson* said all presidents try to
manipulate the press but the press as a whole can never be
won over and newspapermen eventually "become the enemy*"
(15) Herbert G* Klein* President Nixon 1 s director of
communications* said he felt that the time had come for
"cooling off" of the debate between the broadcast industry
and the Administration*
Zt is obvious from this list that "attitudes toward
the news media" can be assumed to be a relevant variable





This chapter consists of findings concerning
information sources used by flag officers and public
affairs officers* presentation of data used to test the
hypotheses of the study, analyses of the data and reports
of other relevant findings.
Information Sources
Before examining data relevant to the research
hypotheses* we can discuss the news media sources prefer-*
red by the respondents and the degree to which these
sources were utilized. A general observation here is that
public affairs officers consistently reported themselves to
be more frequent users of news media than did flag
officers* except in certain specific instances and in
professional periodical reading.
Selection of news programs and publications showed
similar basic patterns for each group* but there were some
differences in their preferences. Both Admirals and PAOs
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a- Hawspapers. 2a& Washington ZoaL was easily the
newspaper reed most frequently by respondents in each
group. The Poet achieved a mean reading score among flag
officers of 2.6 and among public affairs officers of 2.8.
(Three points were allotted for "daily" reading* two points
for "often* " one point for "rarely" and no points for
"never.") Looking at it in a slightly different way, 78
per cent of the Admirals said they read this paper daily
and another nine per cent read it often; 82 per cent of the
PAOs read this paper daily and all the others read it
often. Flag officers reported themselves more frequent
readers of the Wall S&LS&L Journal and Jfew. XoxX Tifflfia than
did information officers. PAOs were much more likely to
read the tabloid Scripps-Howard Washington Daily Ussaa. than
were Admirals. A total of 54 per cent of flag officers and
80 per cent of information officers also said they
regularly read the Department of Defense press clipping
service. Table 1 shows mean reading scores for newspapers.
b. Tftieviiion. Public affairs officers reported
themselves more frequent viewers in all categories. The
CBS and NBC evening news programs were clearly the most
frequent choices of the two groups. Within groups* PAOs
favored the CBS evening news program slightly* while flag
officers watched NBC more often than CBS. NBC led CBS as a
morning news source for both groups. Table 2 shows mean
viewing scores for television news.
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Washington Daily Mews (evening) .3 1.1
Baltimore Sun (morning) .2 .6
Washington Star (evening) 1.7 2.1
Washington Post (morning) 2.6 2*8
New York Times (morning) 1.6 1.5





aArranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio
to lowest.
TABLE 2
TELEVISION NEWS VIEWING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs
Mean Viewing Scores3
Admirals PAOs
NBC Today Show (morning) .5 1.0
CBS Morning News . .2
CBS Evening News (7s 30 p.m.) 1.1 1.9
ABC Evening News (6s 30 p.m.) .7 1.0
NBC Evening News (7s 00 p.m.) 1.3 1.7
All Others .5 1.0
(N) (125) (51)
aArranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio
to lowest.















c. AadJLa. Again* PAOs rated themselves more
frequent media users in all categories. The ABC news
affiliate in Washington* WMAL* was most often selected by
each group. WTOP, a CBS station with a "nonstop news"
format* was second with the flag officers but was slightly
less frequently heard by PAOs than WRC* the NBC radio news
outlet. For each group there was a positive correlation
between WTOP and "other" radio news programs* indicating a
probable tendency to listen to stations with attractive
music as alternates to the all-news station. Comments by
respondents indicated that radio news is heard quite a lot
in automobiles during the trip to and from work. Other
respondents commented that they chose stations because of
the type of music played rather than for news content.
Table 3 gives radio news listening scores.
d. fewa Magazingg. For the three publications
categorized as news magazines in this study* PAOs were more
regular readers than Admirals. Table 4 shows that TfotA was
regularly read by more Admirals and PAOs than either of the
other two. PAOs were much more frequent readers of
KtWVnnft than flag officers* but readership of the conserv-
ative &. Sju BfiKA AQd World Report was about the same for
each group. For Admirals* being a regular reader of Si*. fiU
JteKA was just as likely as being a regular reader of
HcMBwaftlc . Since national readership of the former does not
approach JfewjStt££&'s* this finding may indicate an
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TABLE 3
RADIO STATION NEWS REPORTS HEARD BY ADMIRALS AND PA0S
Mean Listening Scores3
Admirals PAOs
WRC (NBC) .5 1.2
WMAL (ABC) 1.2 1.5
WTOP (CBS) .9 1.1
All Others .8 1.2
aArranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio
to lowest.
TABLE 4







U. S. News and World Report 34 35
(N) (125) (51)
Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio
to lowest.





independent decision by the flag officers in favor of the
more conservative editorial policy.
e* Professional and military-ojiantfid periodical*-
In this category, flag officers were clearly more avid
readers than information officers. More than twice as many
Admirals as PAOs said they read Arm^d XOXfiga. Manadamant*
for example. The groups were about equal in readership of
general interest military-oriented publications such as
&svy liiasa* Armed Forces, Journal * and &LL &aa£&* a monthly
magazine published by the Navy. Another Navy publication*
Direction magazine* which provides guidance to commanding
officers and public affairs officers* was read by almost
all of the PAOs and by almost none of the Admirals.
fnOTTfflPlVHr? ttift&aJL* a newsletter-type publication of the
Defense Department intended primarily for the management
level* was more regularly read by Admirals by a 3-2 margin.
Readership of Navy Xiffl&fi.* a weekly newspaper* was highest
overall. Eighty per cent of both admirals and public
affairs officers read it. Table 5 shows comparisons for
the periodicals in this category.
f. Qfrlier periodleal
a
. Table 6 indicates that
readership percentages for periodicals in this category
were generally lower than for professional and military-
oriented periodicals* and group preferences were mixed.
More Admirals (48 per cent) than PAOs (41 per cent) were
readers of National geographic* which topped other
al a art.-) ,tebn&q»v*ni
: *w •xav #»I1 »y*°^*W3 aid* fll
.
-r<i>«>--n||| *fnT^ btua£ fe*«* y*^^ &*** *cys<! **
i«bA I »m*i *bo= 1 bos •€** •*. XI»
tfa*W ft *Jte£lJtI XEEH




3*4 iw- &*) aI»*i«&A 91M
iartto b»q< ffyjyy^ f*ff****** io «:c»hee'X
a:>
TABLE 5
PROFESSIONAL AND MILITARY-ORIENTED PERIODICAL READING





All Rands 70 78
Navy 50 53
Navy Times 80 80
Armed Forces Journal 57 53
Naval Institute Proceedings 66 51
Commanders Digest 61 41
Naval Aviation News 34 22
Aviation Week & Space
Technology 26 14
Armed Forces Management 56 24




Arranged in order from highest PfcO/Admiral ratio
to lowest.
















































Arranged in order from highest PAO/Adroiral ratio
to lowest.






periodicals in this category in both groups* readership*
Fortqiya readers among the flag officers outnumbered those
in the PAO group by more than 3-1. 14fa and LQQ& were more
regularly read by information officers than by flag
officers* and R«*d«r'g piqna* more regularly by Admirals
than PAOs. XH fiuifiLa* the leading magazine in national
circulation, was read by only five per cent of the
Admirals and 16 per cent of PAOs. And what sort of man
reads Playboy? Well, in the Navy it is more likely to be a
public affairs officer (37 per cent) than a flag officer
(11 per cent) • It is impossible to control this finding
for age.
Teats of HyppthagQg
Hypothesis 1 predicted that attitudes of flag
officers toward the news media would be significantly less
favorable than attitudes of information officers* In the
test of this hypothesis, a low summated attitude score
indicates favorability toward the news media on eight
attitude measuring statements* Possible scores range from
eight to 24. The mean summated attitude score for flag
officers is 16*9, with a standard deviation of 4*3* The
mean summated attitude score for public affairs officers is
11*7, with a standard deviation of 3*1* This clearly
supports the hypothesis (z • 8.97* p<*001); the flag
officers, as a group, rate themselves as dramatically less
favorable toward the media than do the information officers
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as a group. Moreover* as Table 7 indicates* flag officers
had significantly less favorable attitudes than information
officers on <*ach of the separate measuring statements*
These data strongly suggest that Admirals and PAOs
have different attitudes toward the media* but do not
indicate why* One possibility is that favorability toward
the aedia is based on media consumption. Accordingly* the
"mult jl-media users'* were separated from individuals who did
not meet the "multi-media" criteria defined in Chapter III.
Table 8 shows a comparison of summated attitude scores for
multi-media user Admirals and multi-media user PAOs* and
indicates that multi-media use does not account for the
difference in group attitudes. Multi-media Admirals had
exactly the same attitude score as other Admirals* and
multi-media PAOs were slightly less favorable to the news
media than other PAOs. Differences between Admiral and PAO
group scores continued to be statistically significant.
In a similar test* the results of which are also
shown in Table 8* "high media users" were compared with
others in their groups. While high media user Admirals had
a mean attitude score that was somewhat (but non-
significantly) more favorable to the media than others* high
media user PAOs had a mean attitude score that was somewhat
lflga favorable (but also non-significant ly) than other PAOs.
Again the predicted differences between Admiral and PAO
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groups ware significant, regardless of the level of media
use.
On the basis of this analysis, it appears that
neither variety of media use* as typified by the multi-
media user* nor quantity of media consumption can explain
the difference between the two groups of officers in their
attitudes toward the media*
Another possibility is that educational level is
related to attitude toward the media. To examine this*
respondents who had one or more years of postgraduate study
were separated from those who had done only undergraduate
work. (All but one of the 176 respondents indicated at
least four years of college, and that one said he had
"3**.") Table 9 shows the results of the analysis of
attitude scores divided this way. Again, Hypothesis 1 is
supported, and educational level appears to have a
negligible relationship to attitude scores.
There is the possibility that flag officers who
have served in public affairs assignments at some time
during their career hold attitudes toward the media that
are not significantly different from PAD attitudes.
Table 10 shows the results of a test of this supposition.
It indicates that although flag officers with PAO experi-
ence had a more favorable score than other flag officers
(very close to a statistically significant level) , their
score is still significantly less favorable than that of
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FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
Admirals PAOs











16.5 (28) 11.6 (25) z * 4.37. p<.001
17.0 (97) 11.8 (26) z - 7.33, p<.001
2 * .51 z » .22
n.s. n.s.
Notes Low mean score indicates favorable attitude
toward media; "Some Postgraduate Study" indicates one or
more years.
TABLE 10







PAO duty 15.8 (16) 11.7 (51) z sj 3.60, p<.001
No PAO duty 17.1 (109) - - -
Column
Significance
Test z • 1.60
n.s.













Additional partialing analyses separated individ-
uals within each group according to characteristics that
tight account for the between-group differences in attitude
scores. For a quick look at the data, flag officer and
information officer scores were dichotomised according to
whether favorability toward the media was "high" or "low."
There were 62 flag officers in the high favorability cell
with 8 to 17 points on the attitude measurement scale* and
63 in the low favorability cell with 18-24 points. PAOs
were divided with 24 in the high favorability cell (8-11
points) and 27 in the low cell (12-18 points). Table 11
gives the results of this analysis* which can be summarized
as follows) Flag officers who had attended a service
college such as the Naval War College or national War
College tended to have more favorable attitudes toward the
media than those who attended no service college; source of
an Admiral's commission (i.e.* whether Naval Academy or
not) had almost no relation to attitude toward the media;
those who had been flag officers for less than five years
were slightly more favorable to the media than their
seniors; and those whose experience was in surface ships
were more favorable than staff or special duty Admirals*
aviators or submariners. Hone of these differences was
significant. For PAOs* favorability decreased with rank*
except that the highest ranking* the Captains* scored more
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favorably than Commanders* Lieutenant Commanders* or
Lieutenants.
It appeared from this that public affairs officers
with the rank of Commander might score near enough to the
Admirals' score to eliminate group differences. Table 12
compares these scores. They remained statistically
significant (z * 2.99, p<«01). Still another possibility
was that PAOs with less than four years of PAO duty* if
separated from the other PAOs* would leave a PAO group with
no significant difference in score from the Admirals.
Table 13 presents the data from this test. Again* signif-
icant differences occurred between the PAOs and Admirals.
All these tests of Hypothesis 1 show a single
significant relationship in respondents* attitudes toward
the mediae flag officers are less favorable than informa-
tion officers* and there seem to be no factors of either
career history or media use that explain the difference.
This is rather strong evidence in support of the reasoning
that led to Hypothesis 1; i.e.* the difference is most
likely attributable to the different bureaucratic roles
played by these officers.
Hypothgsia 7 was formulated to test the proposition
that Admirals and public affairs officers perceived each
others' attitudes as reifications* and that PAOs were more
likely to reify flag officer attitudes than vice versa.














FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA* PAOs OP COMMANDER RANK
COMPARED TO PLAC OFFICERS
Admirals PAO Commanders
Mean (N) Mean (N) Significance Test
16.9 (125) 13.4 (9) z - 2.99, p^.Ol
Notes Low score indicates favorability toward
media.
TABLE 13






Mean (N) Mean (N) Test
PAOs for 1-4 years * * 10.8 (16) z - 8.36
p <.001
PAOs for 5 years
or more * * 12.1 (35) z =* 7.27
p <.001
Column Significance
Test z « 1.59
n.s.
*For con^parative purposes, totals for all Admirals
(mean 16.9, N-125) wert tested against PAO totals.
Motet Low mean score indicates favorability toward
media.
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they thought most of the other group would tend generally
to agree or disagree with eight attitude measuring state-
ments about the news media* "no opinion" responses were
consistently higher for the Admirals than for the PAOs f
indicating that the Admirals were more unable or unwilling
to generalize about PAO attitudes than PAOs were about
Admirals* attitudes. Table 14 shows the responses for each
group. One statement called for two reifications
—
individuals were asked what they thought about "most
reporters. " On this question* flag officers chose Mno
opinion" 37 per cent of the time when assessing the PAO
group's attitude. When giving their own attitude* many
were also unable to generalise* 23 per cent opting for "no
opinion." PAOs* on the other hand* had no problem in
generalizing about reporters* just as they had none in
generalizing about flag officers. (See Table 7.)
These data indicate that both groups perceived each
others' attitudes as reifications* and that PAOs were
significantly more likely to have a generalized picture of
flag officer attitudes than vice versa.
Hvpoth»«iH 3 predicts that flag officer attitudes
toward the news media will be perceived by information
officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are*
and that attitudes of information officers will be perceived
by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than
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officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer
opinions than vice-versa. Hypoi-in»«i* s is that congruency
(perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for
information officers. Figure 2 presents summated mean
scores for the coorientation variables. The results
strongly support these inter-related hypotheses * with one
exception*
Public affairs officers* perceptions of Admirals'
attitudes toward the media have a mean summated score of
18.7 * compared to the flag officers' actual score of 16.9.
(z 2.73, p<«01) Flag officers' perceptions of public
affairs officers* attitudes have a mean score of 15.4*
compared to the actual 11.7 score, (z • 6.73, p<«001)
Thus* as predicted* information officers are more accurate
than flag officers* but in each case the perceptions are
significantly in error. Also* congruency is greater for
Admirals* who perceive information officers' mean score as
1. 5 from their own score, (z * 2.94* p <.01) Information
officers perceive a huge lack of agreement (z 10.29*
P<.001) between their score and the Admirals'. The
direction and extent of error in perception is as predicted
for the public affairs officers. They think the flag
officers are more hostile to the media than they actually
are. But the prediction about Admirals' perception is only
partially supported. Although the direction in the
Admirals' perception of PAO attitudes is as expected (the
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Fig. 2.—Cooriantation Model with Agreement* Accuracy, and
Congruency Scores* for Flag Officers (K-125) and
Public Affairs Officers (N-51) Attitudes Toward
the Hews Media.
•Motei Low mean attitude score indicates favorabil-













Admirals think information officers are significantly more
favorable toward the media than the Admirals themselves
are)* they clearly believe the FAQs are significantly less
favorable toward the media than PAOs actually are (z - 6.73 #
p <*G01). and this is contrary to Hypothesis 3 and to
Sherif and Hovland's theory of "contrast effect* * This
unexpected finding is discussed below*
Hypr>t-ii«>yig fi holds that both groups are less
favorable toward television than toward newspapers or news
magazines, and that this is particularly the case Where the
fairness and unbiased nature of news about the Navy is in
question. Data presented in Table 15 generally support
this hypothesis* PAO attitudes are significantly more
favorable to news magazines and newspapers than to tele"
vision* Admirals' attitudes are significantly more favor-
able toward news magazines than television and they are
more favorable overall toward newspapers than toward
television* but not to a statistically significant degree*
There is an anomaly in that Admirals indicated more
favorability toward television when asked whether or not
they tend generally to agree that Navy news is fair and
unbiased on the television news program(s) they regularly
watch and in the newspaper (s) and news magazine (s) they
regularly read* One possible explanation for this is that
their attitudes relate to specific newspapers and television
news programs* The near monopoly of the liberal Washington
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aa the local rooming newspaper can be contrasted with
a television menu consisting of three network news programs
in prime evening news viewing hours and several other net"
work and local news shows* and with the trio of news
magazines that are available. Additionally* some of the
flag officers indicated dissatisfaction with the Po»t in
written comments in this survey* One said* for examples
In my opinion the Washington Post is a dangerous news-
paper. Since it is the only morning newspaper* it has
too (much) circulation* thereby influencing many
citizens* It is super liberal* anti-government* and
its destructive criticism seldom offers workable
solutions for the real-world* I also resent the
government subsidizing it by buying thousands of copies
every morning for the various government offices* but I
have no solution since it*s the only local morning
newspaper with adequate coverage* and I'm forced to
read it myself tho I almost regurgitate over the
editorial page* I do much better at night with the
Star* (Flag officer number 35)
On the other hand* this was not a universal
opinion* One Admiral said*
I enjoy my daily Washington Post— I read it from cover
to cover* I like the thorough coverage of world
events in the Post* I generally tend to oppose their
editorial slant and the Herblock cartoons but I am
stimulated to appreciate the unfavorable twist an
observer can takes makes me try to do better* (Flag
officer number 39)
To explore the possibility that attitude toward
this particular newspaper was associated with an unfavor-
able attitude toward newspapers via-a-vis television and
news magazines on this attitude item* a comparison was made
between responses to the attitude statements and television
news programs watched daily or often* newspapers read often
li
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or daily, and news magazines read regularly. Table 16
presents these data. It lends some support for the explan-
ation that an aversion to the waa^ington Rq&L influenced
respondents to downgrade the "newspaper (s) read regularly"*
in comparison to "television news program(s) watched
regularly" and "news magazine (s) read regularly."
HypotihefliH 7 predicts that both groups believe
other military services are more favored by the media than
the Navy is. Table 17 presents data that strongly support
this hypothesis* equally for both groups. Thirty-nine of
47 PAOs who rated a service as most favored by the media
listed either the Air Force or the Marine Corps.
Similarly, of 97 flag officers rating media favorability
toward the services, 91 rated either the Air Force or the
Marine Corps first. The Navy is, however, seen as more
favored than the Array, so the hypothesis is not "absolutely"
supported. Some of those who rated the Army in other than
last place qualified their rating with a comment to the
effect that they were interpreting "most favored" as
meaning the one that had the jb&sJl covaraya . Thus the Army
score, low as it is, may be inflated. The relatively large
number of respondents who chose not to rate the services
could be in agreement with one respondent who saids
As to who gets the best press right now, that's like
arguing relative rank among ensigns, or virtus among















AGREEMENT THAT NAVY MEWS TENDS TO BE PAIR AND UNBIASED,
BY SPECIFIC NEWS SOURCES
Percentage Percentage
Admirals Agree (N) PAOs Agree (N)
Evening TV flaws
ABC 51 (19) 91 (11)
NBC 45 (49) 76 (29)
CBS 49 (45) 75 (36)
Hew^paparft
Washington Post 32 (108) 82 (51)
Washington Daily
News 29 (7) 71 (17)
Wall Street
Journal 40 (76) 92 (12)
Washington Star 40 (68) 79 (38)
Mew York Tines 42 (68) 77 (22)
Baltimore Sun 100 (2) 80 (5)
Time 53 (70) 85 (34)
Newsweek 61 (43) 81 (31)
U. S. News and
World Report 65 (43) 67 (18)
Notes Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral
ratio to lowest, in each media category.
Respondents did not rate each program or publica-
tion specifically. "Agree" answers to "fair and unbiased"
statements were analysed by those that respondents
indicated they regularly watched or read. As a result, the























MILITARY SERVICE HOST FAVORED BY THE MEDIA,
M PERCEIVED BY ADMIRALS AKD PAOc
Admirals (N-97) PAOs (N»47)
Mean Mean
Air Force 2.4 2.3





Note i Three points were allotted for a first place
ranking* two for second, one for third* none for last.














The results of this research generally support two
major hypotheses—that Navy public affairs officers have
more favorable attitudes toward the news media than Navy
flag officers have* and that there are systematic distor-
tions in the way each group perceives the other's attitudes
<
The concrete findings of the study have implications in
several directions* This chapter discusses the findings in
terms of their implications for Navy public affairs* for
public relations and the news media in general* and for
communications research.
Mavy Fufrlic Affairs
Navy public relations was subordinated to the
Office of Naval Intelligence until the beginning of World
War II* The Navy's Office of Information was established
to meet conditions prevalent during that war* most
particularlyi an organized* accredited and sometimes
uniformed military press corps; a censorship program; total
national mobilization in support of the war effort*
and general popularity of the armed forces* The major news
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new3reels. The general philosophy of public relations was
that publicity is the pathway to public support. Hone of
these conditions is the sane thirty years later.
The public affairs specialty in the Navy was
established after World War II in the context of wartime
experience. This group of fewer than a hundred officers
included many ex-newsmen. The public information program
and the specialists who manned it were viewed by top Navy
management primarily as tools for achieving public support
at a time when competition between services for a reduced
military budget was intense. The Navy's public relations
program shrank after World War II, expanded during the
Korean fighting, contracted again after Korea, was enlarged
as American involvement in Vietnam increased in the mid-
1960 »s, and by 1970 was shrinking again. The scope of
public relations activities has been associated more with
the needs and interest of the news media during wartime
than with the Havy^s organizational goals—which would
logically call for more public relations activity when
there is not a natural public interest in the military.
Perhaps one reason that Navy public relations
activities have not always logically pursued organizational
goals is the traditional low priority assigned to public
relations by professional military men, and thair distinct
disinclination to become involved in the public information
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have definite attitudes toward the media. Seemingly, news
media coverage of the Navy is salient enough to be
considered a high priority concern of the service's manage-
ment. Yet the group of specialists dealing with public
affairs is still small. It is subordinated and out of the
main stream of the Navy's officer corps. Its attitudes are
either unknown or misread by many flag officers. Quite
probably it is impotent in its ability to influence manage-
ment decisions in many cases. Since such differences in
attitudes toward the news media and perceptions of those
attitudes exist between Admirals and PWs t an observer is
forced to comment about both the "attitude gap" and the
"communications gap" within the organization, and how
these may affect Navy public relations.
It is quite possible that these gaps result from
the personnel structure of the Navy. Flag officers are the
select elite chosen to lead others. They are the cream of
the crop, representing long years of experience and the
positive traditions of the Navy, including the tradition of
non-involvement in public affairs activity. They are
dedicated to their service and to their country. Public
affairs officers, while not prohibited from having one of
their number become a flag officer, have never had an
Admiral. A description of the information specialty in the
Navy (Larson, in progress) shows that specialists were at









performed work not directly related to operating ships or
aircraft at sea. Larson's research indicates a trend in
the Navy toward greater appreciation for the public affairs
function and less criticism of the specialist group in the
1960 'a. The older patterns of thought remain* however, as
the Navy's organization shows. That information duty, even
of a non-specialist nature, is a kiss of death to the
career ambitions of a naval officer is illustrated by the
present study's findings that only 13 per cent of the flag
officer respondents had ever served in public affairs
billets. Some of these started at the top, after beconing
Admirals, with assignment as Chief of Information. hXX the
Chiefs of Information of the Navy Department have been
either aviators, submariners or surface line officers. The
Mavy has, in its personnel system, effectively concluded
that—at the top
—
public relations is too important to be
left to public relations specialists, while down the lias
it is too unimportant to require uniformly outstanding
performance. This gives special meaning to a comment by
one Admiral respondents
Navy Public Affairs officers are uniformly incompetent.
They are failures as naval officers who are attracted
to the supposed glamor of association with big names.
My personal experience in working with PAOs has been
that they have, when accompanying me to monitor a
meeting with the media, been utterly useless, and in
any cases a detriment to the effort, butting in,
trying to aggrandize themselves, etc., doing everything
but something useful. I can't say much more for the
caliber of the average reporter I have worked with.
(Plag officer number 88)
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Actually, the results of this study lend some
support for a belief that Admirals have more faith in PAOs
as standard naval offioers than is warranted. Flag
officers clearly believe chat information officer attitudes
toward the media are much closer to the Admirals' own
attitudes than they really are. This finding downgrades
the typical public relations man's complaint that manage-
ment does not support the PAO because it thinks he is "on
the newsman's side." The PAOs are a lot more favorable to
newsmen than management knows* probably because they have
carefully concealed their empathy with the media from a
management that they in turn view as being more hostile to
the media than it really is. trhether closing this communi-
cations gap would have a saiutory affect on Navy public
relations or not is debatable.
As for the attitude gap, there are two approaches.
One is to assume that the gap should be closed $ that
Admirals and PAOs should have similar attitudes toward the
news media. The other is to argue that the attitude
difference is natural and needs no rectification. If we
adopt the former approach, it is clear that there must be
more communication between the two groups* and that this
communication must be doubly successful; more accurate
cross-perception must develop* and attitudes must change.
If we accept the status quo of the latter approach* we are
saying that both groups have attitudes toward the media




















that will benefit the Navy in the long runt PAOs who work
with the media understand media problems and should have
more favorable attitudes toward the media than management.
In either case* there is reason to believe that the
Navy's public relations personnel structure and policy does
not do justice to the importance of public support to the
Navy. Flag officer attitudes and comments indicate that
they are concerned about the effect the news media have on
public attitudes toward the Navy. The question is whether
they connect this concern with Knorr's (1970) position that
public support is a component of the actual military power
of a nation. These are some of the flag officer comments
s
I believe we need more aggressive news proffering to
media about the Navy—to tell our story i (Flag officer
number 8)
The Navy should get more aggressive about responding to
biased* shaded or emotional reports and articles.
(Flag officer number 121)
News media jQsjtfi and must bjute. Navy assistance in
achieving truly objective reporting of Navy news.
Without it, they will tend to misinterpret, and create
their own slants. (Flag officer number 19)
We need a professionally competent Navy public affairs
group about as badly as we need a more responsible
public press. It's not all bad, but there is much room
for improvement in both. (Flag officer number 24)
The comparative intensity of management's attitudes
toward the news media indicates real concern for the
media's product and its affect on the Navy's public support.
Management probably does recognise the importance of public
support as a component of military capacity in the United












States* perhaps more so than its public relations staff.
But the organization has not demonstrated a commitment to
use its best people in the small group of specialiats that
is supposed to work toward maximizing public support for
the Navy, or as sub-specialists who receive training in
public relations by postgraduate education or learn in
public affairs assignments. Host outstanding senior line
officers of the present, those who are Admirals, have not
held public affairs assignments during their careers* This
gives little reason to believe that potentially outstanding
officers are seeking or being assigned to public affairs
work, either as sub-specialists or transfers to the
specialist group.
Zt is difficult to equate the flag officers*
apparent concern for public relations with the Navy's
failure to take more positive action to encourage its best
people to work in this area. What seems to be called for
is an organizational recognition of the importance to the
country's actual military strength of public support. This
should be backed by a conscious effort to provide a
motivated, top-notch corps of public affairs specialists
and to assign line officer standouts to public affairs work
as a normal and important part of their career development.
In summary, the implications for Navy public
affairs from this study are as follows. Navy management
and public relations staff attitudes toward the news media











are well apart. Flag officers have had little experience
with full-time public relations work and may have marginal
respect for people who work in the communications field.
Management and public relations staff do not communicate
well enough to have accurate perceptions of each other's
attitudes toward the news media. Considering the
"attitude gap, M this "communications gap" may not be so bad
for Navy information specialists--who might find their jobs
harder if management realised how out-of-step F&O attitudes
are on this subject. But it seems that* whatever the risk
for this group* increased accuracy would be a worthwhile
goal of internal communication—whether or not one deems
that increased agreement is also. If each group communi-
cated its values and rationale to the other group better*
it is quite possible that attitudes would become more
homogeneous* and that the Navy's effectiveness with the
news media might be enhanced. An alternate possibility is
that the difference in attitudes is natural because each
group has its own organizational role to fill* and that the
Navy functions better with each holding firmly to its own
attitudes. If that is the case* the relative size* quality
and authority of the groups leave no doubt about one things
when decision-making time comes in the Navy* flag officers
are in charge* and their attitudes toward the news media
are the ones that will prevail. Those attitudes* even if
they are correct and proper* are hardly likely to improve
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the Navy* 8 relation* with the news media.
Public Rainions and the.
Mtvi Hwiia.
The findings of this study are in accord with
Cutlip and Center *s view that the public relations practi-
tioner is the man in the middle in press relations.
Organisations want news reported in a manner that will
promote their objectives and not cause trouble, while news-
men want stories that will interest readers and viewers.
Executives, generally, whether in industry or government,
have complaints against the news media. Media representa-
tives often have counter-complaints.
Said one of the information officer respondents in
the surveys
It appears to me that throughout Navy Public Affairs,
our officers and enlisted are losing whatever identifi-
cation or sympathy they may have had at one time with
or for the working newsman. He is usually "the other
side," hence our defensive public affairs operation.
• • . Add this to the fact that most flag officers,
because of their longtime insulation from the action
and interaction of civilian society, do not appreciate
PA problems nor understand them, and therein lies the
roots of most of the Navy's problems with the press and
with public attitudes. (PAO number 26)
Another obvious implication of the study is that
the Navy has incorporated professional public relations
practitioners within its structure. These are public rela-
tions specialists, not just naval officers who happened to
be assigned to work with the media. They constitute a







as well as loyalty to the organization . In general* public
relations staffs have some handicaps that come from being a
part of the organization* rather than experts from an
outside counseling agency. The staff man has the advantage
of team membership* but an everpresent subordinate role
leads to the danger of his becoming a "yes" man* As we
have seen. Navy public relations staff men's attitudes
toward the media are incorrectly perceived by management*
quite possibly because the PR men have tended to be concili-
atory in their communications up the line in the organiza-
tion. Despite this lack of objectivity handicap* there are
distinct advantages that go along with team membership*
Certainly the public relations staff man in the Navy is
valuable because he has inside knowledge of the military
and his service. As a result he can serve the news media
and his organization better.
Another implication of the study is that service to
the public via the news media is of prime concern to Navy
information officers* In this sense* they are part of a
special breed of practitioners of public relations* those in
government service. While they are devoted to the goals of
their organization and government* they see their function
as complementary to the news media* not antagonistic.
Their favorability toward the media is so pronounced that
it raises some questions about the theory that government-
media relationships are characterized by adverserity"
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(Rivers, 1970). If we take the attitudes of the management
level in this survey, we find attitudes that may be
considered hostile to the media, although not necessarily
more hostile than those of comparable segments of the
American civilian population. But the Navy public affairs
officers
•
attitudes show no support for the hypothesis that
they view the media as an adversary. A much better
characterisation of the newsman/government public relations
man relationship than adversarity, it seems, is what Nimmo
calls "facilitation.*1 Government organizations, the Havy
being one example, are so large and so complex that news
about them cannot be collected with ease by any external
newsgathering organization. Public relations men, working
as agents for newsmen, are able to facilitate news coverage
of the government. The fact that public relations practi-
tioners have a loyalty to their organizations and a basic
commitment to serve them rather than the newsgathering
organizations is really one of value placement. Obviously,
government public relations officials feel that their
organizations are necessary institutions serving in the
public interest. The news media, too, are necessary insti-
tutions serving in the public interest. There need not be
great adversarity if both sets of institutions, government
and media, are performing well. When the complete scope of
government-media relations is examined, it appears that
cooperation and facilitation emerge as the key elements.
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not adversarity. But just as bad news often receives the
attention of the media, and bad media reporting often gains
the attention of those in government, irregularities in
government-media relations (the cases in which adversarity
is the key element) often receive a disproportionate amount
of attention from those who examine these relationships.
The implication of this study is that the public relations
practitioner has a valid, useful purpose in government.
His attitudes provide a bridge between the management of
the organization and newsmen. If he does his job properly
he serves the public, his organization and the media—
probably in that order of priority. It seems that a
mature concept of public relations, in whatever organiza-
tional setting, calls for the same from the individuals who
are practitioners.
As for the news media, the study clearly demon-
strates that Navy admirals are not overwhelmed with
pleasure about the treatment their service has been receiv-
ing in the news department. It shows, too, that if newsmen
have a friend in the Havy, it is likely to be the public
affairs officer. The implication is that news industry
spokesmen who decry the practice of public relations in the
military are ill-advised. It would seem more to their
advantage to support the public affairs specialists as
necessary cogs in the process of mass communication.
Certainly, the answer to getting more information about the
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military to the public does not lie in dismantling military
public information efforts.
Furthermore* data from opinion polls such as those
cited in Chapter II* when compared with the responses of
flag officers and information officers* lead to some
observations about their attitudes that may not fit sons
stereotypes held by the media. One observation is that
flag officers are not very different from the general
public in their attitudes toward the news* If we consider
the fact that the Admirals are highly educated (at least 57
bachelor's degrees* 55 masters* two P'hDs, four law and
seven medical degrees were reported) « that they are gener-
ally well informed* and that they have a great deal of
personal knowledge of news events which involve the Navy*
we recognize that their apparent hostility to the media is
not an isolated phenomenon* but rather the same sort of
response a researcher would probably get if he asked
college presidents what they thought about media coverage
of their universities* politicians what they thought of
news about campaigns* bank presidents what they thought of
economic news reporting* or student leaders for their
opinions about news coverage of the campus* There is
little reason to believe that the majority of flag officers
would agree with the majority of American respondents who
indicated in the CBS poll that they would favor restriction
of press freedom under some circumstances* The flag
-Ml ••• ' »> • '. : . '. >.' ' .
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officer attitudes* then* are neither a surprise nor the
vented frustrations of an isolated minority. They are
rather typical attitudes to be expected from Americans in
similar social roles. The anomaly* if there is one* is the
homogeneous nature of the favorafri* attitudes held by
public affairs officers toward the new function. Here*
too* we have a rather highly educated group (50 of the 51
have college degrees* and 15 hold the master's)* one that
is well informed* and knows a lot about Navy events that
make news. The easy explanation is that PAOs feel a sort
of empathy with newsmen—after all* communication is their
professional specialty in the Navy. Also* while they know
a great deal about the Navy side of news stories* they are
also knowledgeable about the newsmen's problems and the
complicated process of news reporting.
The fact remains* however* that most of the top
management of the Navy—which may be typical of other elite
groups in American society—is not very satisfied with the
job being done by the news media. Yet the responses of the
Admirals ranged from being as unfavorable as possible on
the eight measuring statements to being as favorable as
possible. It is important that we disaggregate individuals
and illustrate that all shades of attitudes are represented
by the group score* as these indicates
In my opinion* news media isn't as biased against us as
we seem to think. (Flag officer number 18)
• • . some papers (and other media) are fair* some are
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not. Some slant news to an unacceptable degree. Some
editorial pages are unfair* even venal and vicious.
Some try very hard to be objective. (Flag officer
number 20)
We tend to blame the press rather than ourselves when
an unfavorable event is reported. (Plag officer number
96)
Re Navy coverage. He could do a lot worse* and I think
we've been rather fortunate. When we continue to make
boo-boos, why complain? (Flag officer number 114)
Quite often* comments volunteered by the flag
officers were critical of certain aspects such as commer-
cialism or access* as these shows
I believe that most news media are primarily interested
in selling a product. As a result many unimportant
events and people get unwarranted attention by the
press and in many instances the reporting fails to be
factual or concise or accurate. This may be partially
due to the need to fill time or space but the major
reason is to sell a product. (Flag officer number 106)
X feel the Navy could and should submit reelama's or
rebuttals to those articles that ^o/m»* i m*>« give a
biased or unfair story about the Navy. I also feel the
press could and should print the rebuttals as
prominently in the paper as the articles they refute.
For example—the fifixy. cgrriars took a severe beating in
the press last fall. The Navy placed in the
Congressional Record a factual story about the aircraft
carrier that refuted most of the charges made in the
press (and congress) • This Navy rebuttal never got
published in any newspaper—to my knowledge. (Flag
officer number 69)
Interestingly enough* in light of Wiggins *s thesis
that the conflict between military secrecy and press
freedom is at the root of problems between the military and
the media* only one of the flag officers stressed a concern
about secrecy. Ee saids
Having been in security & intelligence field for ...
years* I have developed an unfavorable opinion of news
"-















media reps integrity and their ability to act in theinterest of the U. S. There have been a few exceptions
encountered, but majority have convinced me they willdo almost anything for a name and a buck. (Flaa
officer number 112)
Some respondents lined up with Vice President
Agnew, as did these
t
In my view* V. P. Agnew was entirely correct in his
assessment of the media—and the media reaction to his
view was uniquely revealing of their inbred self-
serving attitude. (Plag officer number 89)
The trend in television news analysis took a real sharp
change after Spiro lowered the boom. If Agnew doesnHkeep quiet, he's going to talk himself right into the
White House! (PAO number 22)
Other comments reveal additional concerns, many of
which were about intentional or unintentional bias in the
news and the general performance of the media. Here are
some of those
i
Although I won § t accuse the media of being wilfully
unfair and biased ... I do believe that newsmen (this
includes TV, Radio, etc.) in general and reporters in
particular are superficial, prone to error or precon-
ceived misinterpretation and generally inclined to
manufacture news or embellish it. My worry is that
they lack the sensitivity to realise this automatically
works to make their product biased or unfair when their
intentions are not deliberate to do this. We need less
aggressive and more responsible performance from these
people. (Plag officer number 58)
The most general complaints I have personally about
newspaper/TV reporting aret (1) the tendency to
editorialise in supposedly pure reporting, and (2) less
than desired thoroughness in research, particularly in
technical and professional areas, on the part of
reporters. I frankly attribute the latter to a less
than appropriate sense of responsibility for what they
are saying on the part of a good many reporters. You
might call it laziness. (Flag officer number 8)














-editorialize"—slanting news reporting to their views
—rather than reporting the news and reporting "all
views." (Flag officer number 98)
I am concerned about the scarcity of honest, unbiased
news reporting—press or TV. Everybody tends to have
"an angle." (Flag officer number 76)
When one reads the occasional news story to which he is
privy—and notes the lack of accuracy—he wonders why
read newspapers, or listen to radio/TV. Yet you can § t
shut off the need because (it is) important. (Flag
officer number 48)
TV and the visual-verbal impact of selective
reporting is . . . highly volatile. ... A high order
of intellectual honesty and close top management
monitoring and supervision (industry not govt.) is
required to assure an objective presentation. ...
(Flag officer number 111)
The news media have become the judge and jury for
public affairs, defense policy, domestic policy and
foreign policy. (Flag officer number 122)
These negative comments should not be taken as the
sputterings of individuals who feel threatened by the
media. They actually repeat many of the themes of
responsible critics of the news industry. For the most
part, they call on the media to improve its performances
something the media has frequently asked of the military.
Some journalists may consider the attitudes of the flag
officers a compliment. Their pens have drawn blood. Yet
they have drawn it with attacks their victims consider
irresponsible under rules that allow for no retaliation.
Certainly, the sword is virtually useless against the pen
in the united States, no matter what the holder of the
sword thinks of those who wield the pen.
A . f. a.
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mnlcationg Rfiaftflgfih
This study put the coorientational model to the
test in a group situation. The model was more useful than
originally anticipated. Foremost, from a methodological
point of view, it directed the researcher to measure
respondents* attitudes and compare them with other atti-
tudes and perceptions of others' attitudes without
explaining—and probably biasing—the research project.
The technique merits further application in organizational
studies. Also, the model permitted the researcher to
measure and compare group characteristics in a meaningful
way. Chaffee and McLeod*s model was intended to describe
dyadic communication situations between two individual
«
.
such as parent and child. This study applied the
coorientation model to two axojAaa, and used a check of the
reification assumption to determine whether one group was
seen as a generalized entity by the other group. The check
showed that "flag officer," as a reification, is a real
"thing- for almost all public affairs officers. In sons
cases, public affairs officers were more likely to visualise
the generalized flag officers as agreeing or disagreeing in
their attitude toward a statement about the news media than
to see themselves as agreeing or disagreeing. To thesu a
generalized flag officer was apparently not much more
difficult to conceptualize than a generalized own personal-











an easy reification for Admirals. It may be argued that
the study stretches the model too much because of the
reification problem. Actually, though, the very fact that
flag officers found public affairs officers difficult to
stereotype in their thinking (as they also found "most
reporters" a difficult reification) is important to the
interpretations of the study. It illustrates an organiza-
tional separation between management and public relations
staff, and leads to an assumption that top management in
the Navy—for various valid reasons—is either not aware of
and acquainted with its public relations specialists, or
else considers their activities and attitudes to have
relatively low priority. Thus the coorientational model
proved very useful even at this point of vulnerability.
Did the reification problem affect the validity of
the empirical data gathered by the study? To a certain
extent it did. If the research had failed to show such
clear results, acceptance of the findings might be chal-
lenged. But there is so little ambiguity in the data that
greater precision of measurement is not required. What the
coorientational model attempts to do, after all, is take a
lot of the impressionistic guess-work out of research and
point toward the reality of the social situation. It
certainly does that in this study, ha a framework for
research, it provides better data than an open-ended
unschematic approach could possibly generate, permitting













the study to focus on its objectives and to incorporate a
convenient rating scale approach to measurement.
This study did not use the coorientation model as
it was originally intended, that is. to evaluate the
communication variable in a social situation. For other
researchers using the model, some important methodological
considerations must be faced. One is the difficulty of
observing communication. A second is the nature of the
person-to-person relationship of individuals in a
coorientational situation. A third, when group study is
undertaken, is measurement of one group's attitudes toward
the other group—is there like or dislike, respect or lack
of respect, etc. There was almost no way to obtain
reliable information about the amount or type of communica-
tion between flag officers and public affairs officers.
Hor was the amount and type of interpersonal communication
a particularly relevant measure for this study, which merely
sought to establish the direction of group attitudes toward
the media and the differences in group perceptions of the
other group's attitudes. Flag officer-public affairs
officer relationships in Washington are not, as a rule, on
a one-to-one basis. Thus, no study of pairs was contem-
plated. Such pairing might be interesting, but it would of
necessity be a limited examination of Admirals and their
personal staff public affairs officers. It seems sufficient








individual units in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy*
Their role relationships are determined by their place in
the navy's structure. Any given information officer in the
survey may have worked closely with an Admiral or Admirals
either in Washington or elsewhere* or that if he has not*
he is well aware of the probability that he will. Flag
officers in Washington may have had public affairs officers
working for or with them in sea or shore assignments. If
not* they no doubt know that they are likely to have a
staff PAG in the future. The organizational role relation-*
ship and the coorientation model make the results of this
study generalizable* and offer the prospect of a follow-on
replication over time. This prospect is particularly
inviting since the news environment of the present study
indicates that attitudes of the respondents may have been
influenced by pronouncements of high government officials
and Navy leaders* by controversy about news reporting that
was covered with at least adequate emphasis by the media*
and by an international and national climate of bad news
for the military. One might hypothesize that at other
times* with different spokesmen* muted controversy* or an
improved news situation* some attitudes toward the media
held by these two groups would change—or that new attitudes
would replace old as the composition of the groups changed.
Such a hypothesis suggests a test of two commonly accepted
assumptions of journalisms (1) that criticism of the news
-J1.J.
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«edi« by leaders causes government organisations to hold
negative attitudes and/or take restrictive action against
the media; or, conversely, that less criticism of the media
by government leaders would cause government officials to
take more favorable attitudes toward the media; (2) that
unfavorable attitudes toward the media develop when the
news is unpleasant; or, officials would be more favorable
to the media if the news were not so bad. We often hear
these two assumptions repeated as part of journalism's
folklore—especially the latter, usually couched in a
"beheading the messenger M analogy—but they deserve
rigorous examination.
Thanks to work by Chaffee and MeLeod and others,
this study
• s findings about Admirals 9 and Paj0s f attitudes
can be considered in relationship to the results of other
coorientational research. Much previous work has indicated
that greater communication is correlated with greater
agreement, accuracy and congruency. But if we assume this
for flag officers and information officers, we are on the
pathway to the assumption that persuasive communication
changes attitudes in proportion to the amount of communica-
tion processed. While it is fashionable to call for more
dialogue to resolve differences of opinion, this "more
communication, more consensus" assumption is not automat-'
ically acceptable, enticing as it may be to a communicator.










another study with other Measures. P. researcher could
select Admiral-FAO pairs # determine their attitudes,
measure in some way their interpersonal communication, and
find out how much like/dislike, respect/lack of respect,
etc., exists, and draw some conclusions. Designing and
obtaining cooperation for such a study would be extremely
difficult, however. Until meaningful research of this
nature is undertaken, we are left with but one way to apply
theory to the real situation. That is to take the findings
of other coorientational studies in communications and
generalize from these to the Havy situation that is known
to exist as a result of this study.
,.







This chapter tails how and why the study was
designed* then summarises its findings and the implications
derived from the research*
The study consisted of a survey of Navy flag
officers (Rear Admirals* Vice Admirals and Admirals) and
Navy public affairs specialists in Washington* D. C, in
early 1970. A self-administered anonymous questionnaire
was completed by 125 Admirals (89 per cent of the survey
population) aad by 51 PAOs (93 per cent response rate)
•
The aim of the research was to determine the comparative
attitudes of these two groups reward the news media of mass
communications. The attitudes of these individuals are
salient to any understanding of Havy public information
policy? they are top management and public relations staff
in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy.
A research design based on Chaffee and McLeod's
coorientation model provided quantified measures of
attitudes toward the media held by each group* as well as
measures of the perceptions of the other group's attitudes.
Favorability or unfavorability toward the media was
109
'
. Hi 9 .-,-. .
.,:•->'' I
auaoqas i £t]
s fc*i- to sifi orf*
MUUH to «ife*» «Vfc£ mir i>up.wc--: sqpO?$ OU3 •••<& to ftftf:
»" Baw;:f to «oblrtl**£ »£
iifi oj j/i* lie*
*><%2oM 5« - »£ o leofttf afloeo ilnxsM** A
to nitftim box




measured by eight statement items to which respondents
could agree or disagree or decline to give an opinion.
Information sources were identified and compared « and
primary sources were compared with attitudes toward specif-*
ic types of media* Attitude agreement* accuracy of
perception* and congruency (perceived agreement) were
measured and compared* Respondents were asked to rate the
military services on the basis of which was* in their
opinion* most favored by the news media.
Public affairs officers reported themselves to be
generally more frequent users than flag officers of news-
papers* television* radio and news magazines* but not of
professional and military-oriented periodicals. Both
Admirals and information officers seemed to rely more on
newspapers than on other media.
Attitudes toward the news media held by information
officers were dramatically more favorable than flag officer
attitudes toward the media. Favorability and unfavorabil-
ity were not related to either variety or quantity of media
use* to educational level* or to Admirals* having served in
public affairs billets at some time during their careers.
Public affairs officers of Commander rank were closer than
those of other PAO ranks to flag officers in attitudes
toward the media. Even so* there was a statistically
significant difference between the attitudes of the Com-
mander group and the Admirals. Service college attendance
J ItttiC

















tended to correlate with a more favorable attitude toward
the media among flag officers* as did experience in surface
ships as opposed to duty in submarines* staff or special
duty, or naval aviation. These differences were not
statistically significant, and the degree of favorability
seemed almost completely unrelated to other partialing
variables i length of time as a flag officer and source of
commission. Public affairs officers with more than four
years' experience as PAOs tended to be less favorable to
the media than those with four years or fewer, but the
difference was not statistically significant*
Admirals were less accurate in predicting public
affairs officer attitudes toward the news media than
information officers were in predicting Admirals* attitudes.
The information officers had a concept of "generalised flag
officers" and were willing to predict attitudes on the
basis of that reification. Visualizing the attitudes of
"generalized public affairs officers" was more difficult
for flag officers. Flag officers perceived greater agree-
ment between their attitudes and PAD attitudes than vice
versa. Public affairs specialists thought flag officers
were less favorable toward the news media than they actually
were. Admirals thought PAOs were less favorable to the
news media than they actually were.
Overall, both groups were more favorable toward
newspapers and news magazines than toward television news.









However, most flag officers thought newspapers they
regularly read were more biased and unfair in their cover-
age of Navy news than television news programs they
regularly watched or news magazines they regularly read.
Both groups felt the Air Force and Marine Corps were more
favored by the news media than the Navy, but rated the
Navy's treatment as better than the Army's.
There were implications from the study for communi-
cations research* for Navy public affairs, and public
relations and the news media in general.
The research project showed that the coorientation
model was useful and valid for a group study, especially
since the results of the study could be interpreted in the
light of previous coorientational research in communica-
tions .
The fact that there was an "attitude gap** and a
"communications gap" between top management and the public
relations staff of the Navy implies some problems for Navy
public affairs. The attitude gap—a striking difference
between PAO and flag officer attitudes toward the news
media—indicates that there is an organisational difference
between these two groups that is so strong it dictates
different attitude patterns. A basic difference in role
functions is apparently the primary reason for the attitude
differences. They may also be partly a result of the Navy's
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of a highly motivated public affairs specialist corps or
assigned outstanding line officers to full-time public
affairs tours with regularity. The communications gap—
a
misreading of attitudes of the other group by both
Admirals and PAOs—indicates that organisational factors
distort interpersonal communications between the groups.
Conciliatory communication by the information officers to
the Admirals left the impression that they are not as
favorable toward the media as they really were? emphasis on
unpleasant reactions to the media in the Admirals' communi-
cations to the PAOs made the information officers think the
Admirals were more hostile to the media than they actually
were. These gaps imply some dysfunction in the Havy, since
those who make decisions about Wavy information policy (the
Admirals) have harsher attitudes toward the media than the
technical public relations specialists who do most of the
dealing with the media—and each group misinterprets the
attitudes of the other. A continued combination of these
factors is unlikely to enhance Navy relations with the news
media or contribute to increased public support, a neces-
sary component of the actual military strength of the
United States.
Implications for public relations and for the news
media in general from the study are primarily twofold
i
(1) The study reaffirms Cutlip and Center's observation
that the public relations man is the man in the middle in
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press relations. The Navy P&Os are mediators between
management and newsman* and their attitudes imply that they
are intent on building bridges between the two.
(2) Although flag officer attitudes are not necessarily
more hostile to the media than could be expected from
individuals in similar civilian social roles* the favorabil-
ity of the public relations practitioners of the Navy
toward the media is homogeneous and quite high in a eompar-
ative sense* This should be a signal to the media that
this particular public relations group wants to serve the
public via the news media. The government-media relation-
ship in this case is more properly described as one of
facilitation and cooperation than one of adversarity* at
least from the public relations man's viewpoint. It is
possible to generalise that public relations staffs in
other organizations* especially government* can be facili-
tating links—bridges* not roadblocks—serving the public
in cooperation with the mass media of communications.
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SURVEY OF FLAG OFFICER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA
(Notes PAO questionnaire was titled "Survey of Public
Affairs Officer Attitudes* " etc. Text of the two
questionnaires was the same* except as noted.)
Motet This is an anonymous questionnaire. The answers are
only to be used in a statistical analysis. Nothing will be
connected with your name. Returned questionnaires will be
destroyed after analysis. There is a space for your
comments at the end of the questionnaire. The success of
this study depends upon complete responses from everyone.
1. What daily television news programs do you watch* and
how regularly?
asksc rasaiy. oiten caily
WMAjrftBC-channaj, 7





The Hunt ley-Brinkly Report
WTQP-cas-Channftl 9
CBS Morning Mews (Joseph
Benti)
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2. What radio news reports do you hear* and how regularly?





Others—for example* WAVA* WDON, WEAM, WEEL, WFAX# WGMS,
WHMC* WHRN, WINX* WLMD, WOL* WOOK, WPGC. WPIX.
WGMR* WUSTf or WWDC (please specify)
t









4* Please check the weekly news magazine (s) you regularly
read* if any.
Newsweek Time .U.S. News & World Report
5. Please check any of these publications which you
regularly read.
All Rands mmwmmmArmed Forces Journal Atlantic
Armed Forces Management ___Aviation Week & Space
Technology
Business Week Commanders Digest Direction
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>efense Dept. press clippings Fortune
—Harpers lAi* .__«.Look Navy, the Maga-
zine of Seapower
Navy Times __J*ational Geographic
Naval Aviation News Naval Institute Proceedings
_
_Playboy TV Guide Readers Digest
__.Undersea Technology
Please list other such publications you regularly reads
6. How often do you hear a "press briefing"?
never rarely often .__ji3aily
7. Here are some statements about television* radio* news-
papers and magazines; about the people who are associated
with them; and about their content—in other words, about
the mass media in general. Please read each statement
and indicate whether you t«nd generally to agree or
disagree with each* or have no opinion.
NO
flfiKES MM— QRIMJm
a. News about the Navy is
reported in a generally
fair and unbiased way.
,
b. We need aggressive news
reporting to insure
honesty in government. _ _ —
c. Performance of the media is
so bad that people should
insist it improve.
d. Television is doing a good
job of reporting the news. _
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f. Navy news in the news-
paper (s) X read is fair
and unbiased.
.___
g. There is too much inter-*
pretation of the news on
television*
h* Newspapers are doing a good
job of reporting the news.
i. Navy news on the television
news program(s) I regularly
watch is fair and unbiased. _
j. Newspaper editorials are
overly critical of govern-
ment.
___ mmm
k. Navy news in the news
magazine (s) I regularly
read is fair and unbiased. mm .
3. Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the
news media? Please rate the Army* Navy, Air Force* and
Marine Corps in order* listing the one you think is
mpat favored as number ( 1) * the second-most favored as
number (2)* etc.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9. Here are some of the same statements you saw earlier.
Please indicate whether or not you think jqoaJL MSZLX.
public aflairs otiticera ia WMhington would tend gener-
ally to agree or disagree with each. (Notes On PAO
questionnaire* respondents were asked how "most Navy
flag officers in Washington" would answer.)
NO
fttiMSi PISflGRaE QRMIGXL
a. News about the Navy is
reported in a generally
fair and unbiased way.
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c. Performance of the media
is so bad that people
should insist it improve.
__
d. Television is doing a good
job of reporting the news.




There is too much inter-
pretation of the news on
television. mmmmm
g. Newspapers are doing a
good job of reporting
the news.





10. For about how long have you been a flag officer?
years
(Notes Not on PAO questionnaire. PAOs were asked, "What
is your rank?")
11. Have you ever served in a primary or collateral duty
public affairs billet?
no yes If yes# about how long aero?
(Notes Not on PA© questionnaire* PAOs were a-rfc*d# "About
how many years have you been a public affairs officer?")
12. What was the source of your commission? Naval Academy
NavCad Other (please specify)
«




Staff or special duty other (please specify) s
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14. Please circle the highest year of school completed
:
High School College Graduate or professional study
1234 1234 1 2 or more
15. List: the degrees you holdi Pegsee Kajpr field
16* What service colleges have you attended?
PLEASE RETURfc THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IK THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE.
THANK YOU.
The following space is provided for any comments you
wish to make about the news media. Navy public affairs
«
this survey, etc. Use the back of the page for your
comments if needed*
•von tbd £
Ml* iO tfWBd •ltd' BJ-
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APPENDIX B
TEXT OF LETTER TO PROSPECTIVE FLAG OFFICER RESPONDENTS
Dear Admiral
As part of my Navy postgraduate studies* X
trying to determine the news media preferences of Flag
officers in the Washington area* and their attitudes toward
the media. This research has the approval of the Chief of
Information. It will be of considerable benefit to our
service if successfully completed, but its value depends
entirely on the cooperation given by individual Flag
officers.
I solicit about five minutes of your personal
time—to fill out the enclosed questionnaire « which is
strictly anonymous.
Your help will be greatly appreciated. A post
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